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Abstract
This paper proposes a semiparametric estimation procedure of the first-price auc-
tion model with risk averse bidders within the independent private value paradigm.
We show that the model is nonidentified in general from observed bids. We then
exploit heterogeneity across auctioned objects to establish semiparametric identi-
fication under a conditional quantile restriction and parameterization of the bid-
ders’ von Neuman Morgenstern utility function. Next we propose a semiparametric
method for estimating the corresponding auction model. This method involves sev-
eral steps and allows to recover the parameters of the utility function as well as
the bidders’ private values and their density. We show that our semiparametric
estimator of the utility function parameters converges at the optimal rate, which
is slower than the parametric one. An illustration of the method on U.S. Forest
Service timber sales is presented and a test of bidders’ risk neutrality is performed.
Key words: Risk Aversion, Independent Private Value, Nonparametric Identifica-
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal unpublished work by Kenneth Arrow and its formalization by Pratt
(1964), risk aversion has become a fundamental concept in economics whenever agents
face situations under uncertainty. This is the case in auctions where bidders must deal with
various types of uncertainties related to the value of the auctioned object, the strategies
used by the other bidders and the private information of their opponents. In particular,
a pervasive economic argument for justifying bidder’s risk aversion is that the value of
the auctioned object is high relative to his assets. Another argument is that a bidder
does not have many alternatives for buying the object other than in the auction. On
the other hand, many important results in the theory of auctions crucially depend on
the assumption of risk neutrality. For instance, within the independent private value
(IPV) paradigm, the revenue equivalence theorem established by Vickrey (1961) states
that English, descending, first-price sealed-bid and second-price auctions lead to the same
expected revenue for the seller provided bidders are risk neutral. Such an important result
no longer holds when bidders are risk averse. See Harris and Raviv (1981) and Riley and
Samuelson (1981).1
Despite the importance of risk aversion in auction modeling, very few empirical studies
have attempted to assess the extent of bidders’ risk aversion on field data. See Baldwin
1Likewise, the optimal auction mechanism is quite involved under bidders’ risk aversion as it requires
complex transfers among bidders. See Maskin and Riley (1984) and Matthews (1987). For a recent survey
of auction theory, see Klemperer (1999).
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(1995) and Athey and Levin (2001) using US Forest Service timber auctions. A reason
is that economic theory provides few reduced-form implications of risk aversion, which
are moreover difficult to test on field data.2 An alternative approach is to consider that
the observed bids are precisely the outcomes of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the
underlying auction game. This is known as the structural approach, which has been
developed by Paarsch (1992) and Laffont, Ossard and Vuong (1995). For a recent survey,
see Perrigne and Vuong (1999). Our paper adopts such an approach and focuses on the
identification and estimation under nonparametric assumptions in the spirit of Laffont
and Vuong (1996) and Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000).
Throughout, we consider first-price sealed-bid auctions with risk averse bidders within
the IPV paradigm. From Maskin and Riley (1984) it is known that a first-price auction
generates a larger revenue than an ascending auction when bidders are risk averse. Thus,
bidders’ risk aversion can provide a rationale for the use of first-price auctions.3 A first
part of our paper briefly presents the model and reviews the existence, uniqueness and
smoothness of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy. Existence and uniqueness of such
a strategy follow from Maskin and Riley (1996, 2000) among others. In particular, these
properties are difficult to establish when the reserve price is nonbinding because of a well-
known singularity of the differential equation characterizing the equilibrium strategy. In
addition to providing an alternative proof of such properties, we derive the smoothness
of the equilibrium strategy with respect to the bidder’s private value as well as potential
exogenous variables characterizing the auctioned object.
A second part is devoted to the identification of the auction model, i.e. whether its
structural elements can be uniquely recovered from observed bids. The structural elements
are the bidders’ utility function and the bidders’ private value distribution. Unlike Donald
and Paarsch (1996) who consider a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), we consider a
2In contrast, the experimental literature has paid much attention to bidders’ risk aversion as it can
frequently explain observed overbidding (above the risk neutral Bayesian Nash equilibrium). See Cox,
Smith and Walker (1988) and Goere, Holt and Palfrey (2002) among others.
3Hence, the development of econometric methods assessing the extent of risk aversion is especially
important in first-price auctions. In many situations, empirical researchers have observed the exclusive
use of a particular mechanism for a large variety of goods. For instance, ascending auctions are used for
art and memorabilia, while first-price auctions are used for procurements and natural resources except
for timber, which is sold through both mechanisms.
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general von Neuman Morgenstern (vNM) utility function exhibiting possibly risk aversion.
First, we show that this general model is nonidentified from observed bids even when
the utility function is restricted to belong to well known families of risk aversion. In
particular, restricting bidders to have a constant relative risk aversion is not sufficient
to achieve identification. Second, we show that any bid distribution can be rationalized
by a CRRA model, a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) model, and a fortiori a
model with general risk aversion. Such a striking result implies that a CRRA model and
a CARA model cannot be discriminated against each other. It also implies that the game
theoretical model does not impose testable restrictions on bids. Furthermore, one can
consider either CRRA or CARA utility functions without loss of power for explaining
observed bids, despite either model not being identified.
In view of the preceding results, a third part of our paper seeks weak and palatable
restrictions that can be used to achieve identification of the auction model with risk
averse bidders. Specifically, we exploit heterogeneity across auctioned objects under the
assumption that the private value distribution conditional upon the characteristics of the
auctioned objects satisfies a parametric quantile restriction. Unlike previous work such
as Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000), Li, Perrigne and Vuong (2000, 2002), Campo,
Perrigne and Vuong (2002), such an additional restriction was not necessary to identify
the auction models considered there. Of course, there are other possible restrictions such
as requiring that some quantile be known, but the latter assumption is unattractive as the
postulated value of some quantile directly affects the estimated degree of risk aversion. We
then restrict the bidders’ vNM utility function to be parametric. Under these conditions,
we show that the utility function parameters and the conditional private value distribution
of the model with risk adverse bidders are semiparametrically identified as no parametric
assumption on the latent private value distribution is made. As a matter of fact, we show
that these two identifying conditions are necessary as dropping either one of them looses
identification. In this sense, our semiparametric modeling is natural, while constituting a
new direction for the literature on structural analysis of auction data.
A fourth part of the paper provides an upper bound for the convergence rate which
can be attained by estimators of the parameters of the utility function. Given the semi-
parametric nature of our model, it is important to study the best (optimal) rate that an
estimator of the risk aversion parameters can achieve. To do so, we rely on the minimax
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theory developed by e.g. Ibragimov and Has’minskii (1981). As is well-known, estimation
of the upper boundary of a distribution can be achieved at a faster rate than any other
quantile. For this reason, we focus on a parametric restriction on the upper boundary of
the private value distribution to achieve a faster convergence rate and a greater precision
for the estimator. Specifically, when auctioned objects’ heterogeneity is characterized by d
continuous variables and the underlying density is R continuously differentiable, we show
that the optimal rate for estimating the risk aversion parameters is N (R+1)/(2R+3). Such
a rate is independent of the dimension d of heterogeneity and is slower than
√
N , which
is unattainable given the assumed smoothness R.
A fifth part of the paper addresses the estimation of the structural elements, i.e. the
parameters of the vNM utility function and the underlying conditional density of bidders’
private values. We then develop a multistep semiparametric estimation procedure. A first
step consists in estimating the conditional density of bids at its upper boundary. This
involves nonparametric estimation of the upper boundary using Korostelev and Tsybakov
(1993) theory of image reconstruction as well as the corresponding conditional densities
at these upper bounds. A second step focuses on the estimation of the utility function
parameters exploiting the fundamental equation of the auction model. This leads to
(possibly weighted) nonlinear least squares (NLLS) using the nonparametric estimates
obtained in the first step. A third step allows us to recover the bidders’ private values
and their underlying conditional density following Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000)
once the utility function parameters are estimated.
We establish the asymptotic properties of this estimator. In particular, we show that
our estimator of the utility function parameters attains the optimal rate N (R+1)/(2R+3).
This contrasts with most
√
N -consistent semiparametric estimators developed in the
econometric literature, see Powell (1994) for a recent survey.4 As a matter of fact, stan-
dard results on
√
N -consistent semiparametric estimators as given in Newey and McFad-
den (1994) do not apply. Another notable feature of our estimation problem is that it
involves a nonlinear regression model with a bias and a variance that decreases and in-
creases with the smoothing parameter, respectively. This diverging variance of the error
term in the equation defining the utility function parameters is the main reason why our
4Notable exceptions of semiparametric estimators converging at a slower rate than
√
N are Manski
(1985), Horowitz (1992), Kyriazidou (1997) and Honoré and Kyriazidou (2000).
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semiparametric estimator does not achieve the standard parametric rate.
Lastly, in addition to providing an estimator converging at the optimal rate as well
as not requiring a parametric specification of the bidders’ private value distribution, our
method is computationally simple as it circumvents both the numerical determination and
inversion of the equilibrium bidding strategy. This is especially convenient when there
is no closed form solution to the differential equation defining the equilibrium strategy.
This is the case when risk aversion is not of the simple CRRA form. We then illustrate
our procedure on the US Forest Service timber auctions. In particular, a test of bidders’
risk neutrality is performed and bidders are found to be fairly risk averse.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly presents the model and discusses
the properties of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy of the corresponding auction
game. Section 3 investigates the identification of the first-price auction model with risk
averse bidders and provides general nonidentification results. Understanding of such re-
sults leads to additional restrictions used to achieve semiparametric identification of the
model, which is the purpose of section 4. Section 5 provides an upper bound for the
optimal convergence rate, which can be attained by a semiparametric estimator of the
utility function parameters. Section 6 presents our semiparametric estimation procedure
with its various steps and statistical properties. Section 7 is devoted to an illustration
of our method to timber auction data. Section 8 concludes. Five appendices collect the
proofs of our theoretical results.
2 Model and Equilibrium Strategy
This section presents the first-price sealed-bid auction model with risk averse bidders
within the IPV paradigm. It also establishes the existence, uniqueness and smoothness
of the equilibrium bidding strategy.
The Model
A single and indivisible object is sold through a first-price sealed-bid auction. All
sealed bids are collected simultaneously. The object is sold to the highest bidder who
pays his bid to the seller. Within the IPV paradigm, each bidder is assumed to know his
own private value vi for the auctioned object but not other bidders’ private values. The
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bidders’ private values are drawn independently from a common distribution F (·), which
is absolutely continuous with density f(·) on a support [v, v] ⊂ IR+. The distribution
F (·) and the number of potential bidders I ≥ 2 are assumed to be common knowledge.
Moreover, each bidder is potentially risk averse.
Let UvNM(·) be a von Neuman Morgensten utility function common to all bidders with
U ′vNM(·) > 0. Because of potential risk aversion, the utility function is assumed to be
weakly concave, i.e. U ′′vNM(·) ≤ 0. All bidders have the same initial wealth w ≥ 0. This
gives a utility function of the form UvNM(w+·), where the argument refers to the monetary
gain from the auction. All bidders are thus identical ex ante and the game is said to be
symmetric.5 Bidder i then maximizes his expected utility EΠi = UvNM(w+vi−bi)Pr(bi ≥
bj, j 6= i) + UvNM(w)[1− Pr(bi ≥ bj, j 6= i)] with respect to his bid bi, where bj is the jth
player’s bid.
Bidder i’s problem is equivalent to maximizing [UvNM(w+ vi− bi)−UvNM(w)]Pr(bi ≥
bj, j 6= i). Let U(·) = UvNM(w + ·) − UvNM(w). Note that U(·) is strictly increasing,
weakly concave and satisfies U(0) = 0. Hereafter, we consider the maximization of
EΠi = U(vi − bi)Pr(bi ≥ bj, j 6= i), (1)
where U(·) satisfies the preceding properties. This corresponds to the most studied case in
the auction literature where the quality of the auctioned item is known and has equivalent
monetary value. See Case 1 in Maskin and Riley (1984).6 In addition, because the scale
is irrelevant, we impose the normalization U(1) = 1. The risk neutral case is obtained
when U(·) is the identity function.
It is useful to recall some basic properties of utility functions with risk aversion. Let α
and β be arbitrary constants with α > 0. A common measure of absolute risk aversion is
the ratio −U ′′vNM(·)/U ′vNM(·), which can be constant or nonincreasing. This gives the set
5Relaxing the assumption of bidders’ common wealth, i.e. letting wi be bidder i’s wealth, will lead to
an asymmetric game if the wis are common knowledge and to a multisignal game if the wis are private
information. Both cases are beyond the scope of this paper. For asymmetric extensions, see Campo
(2002). For multisignals, see Che and Gale (1998) for a model with budget constraints.
6Maskin and Riley (1984) consider a more general model where the utility of winning is of the form
u(−bi, vi) and the utility of loosing is equal to w(·). Because we use a vNM utility function, u(−bi, vi) =
UvNM (w + vi − bi) and w(0) = UvNM (w). Hence, the utility of loosing with no payment is equal to the
utility of winning with payment equal to the bidder’s value.
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UCARA of constant absolute risk aversion utility functions and the set UDARA of decreasing
absolute risk aversion utility functions. A well-known form for the former is given by
UvNM(x) = α(1−exp(−ax))+β, with an absolute measure of risk aversion a > 0. Another
common measure is the relative risk aversion, which is defined as −xU ′′vNM(x)/U ′vNM(x).
This quantity can be either constant or nonincreasing, which gives the set UCRRA of
constant relative risk aversion utility functions and the set UDRRA of decreasing relative
risk aversion utility functions. A well-known characterization for the former is given by
UvNM(x) = αx
1−c/(1− c) + β for c ≥ 0 and c 6= 1 and UvNM(x) = α log x + β for c = 1.
Relative risk aversion is then measured by c. Note that if initial wealth w = 0, then
0 ≤ c < 1 because the utility of loosing the auction would be unbounded otherwise.
There exist other families of vNM utility functions exhibiting risk aversion, which have
been considered in the literature. See e.g. Gollier (2001). Below we consider mostly the
above four families, though our results can apply to other families.
Existence, Uniqueness and Smoothness of the Equilibrium Strategy
¿From Maskin and Riley (1984), if a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy
s(·, U, F, I) exists, then it is strictly increasing, continuous and differentiable.7 Thus (1)
becomes EΠi = U(vi − bi)F I−1(s−1(bi)), where s−1(·) denotes the inverse of s(·). Hence,
imposing bidder i’s optimal bid bi to be s(vi) gives the following differential equation
s′(vi) = (I − 1)
f(vi)
F (vi)
λ(vi − bi) (2)
for all vi ∈ [v, v], where λ(·) = U(·)/U ′(·). As shown by Maskin and Riley (1984), the
boundary condition is U(v − s(v)) = 0, i.e. s(v) = v because U(0) = 0. Moreover, the
second-order conditions are satisfied.
Maskin and Riley (1984, Theorem 2) prove the existence and uniqueness of s(·) by
noting that the differential equation (2) with boundary condition has a unique solution
when there is a binding reserve price, i.e. p0 > v. In our case, the reserve price is not
binding. Consequently, there is a well-known singularity of (2) at the boundary v, which
prevents the use of such an argument for establishing existence and uniqueness of s(·).
This is the purpose of the next result, which provides in addition the regularity properties
of s(·) used in the following section.
7Moreover, as noted by Maskin and Riley (1984, Remark 2.3), the only equilibria are symmetric when
F (·) has bounded support, which is assumed below.
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We assume that U(·) and F (·) belong to UR and FR defined as follows, respectively.
Definition 1: For R ≥ 1, let UR be the set of utility functions U(·) satisfying
(i) U : [0,+∞) → [0,+∞), U(0) = 0 and U(1) = 1,
(ii) U(·) is continuous on [0,+∞), and admits R + 2 continuous derivatives on (0,+∞)
with U ′(·) > 0 and U ′′(·) ≤ 0 on (0,+∞),
(iii) limx↓0 λ
(r)(x) is finite for 1 ≤ r ≤ R + 1, where λ(r)(·) denotes the rth derivative.
Conditions (i) and (ii) have been discussed previously. Note that limx↓0 λ(x) = 0 since
U(0) = 0 and U ′(·) is nonincreasing. Thus, from (ii) and (iii) it follows that λ(·) admits
R + 1 continuous derivatives on [0,+∞). These regularity assumptions are weak. For
instance, if U(x) = UvNM(w + x)− UvNM(w) with UvNM(·) a suitably normalized CRRA
utility function, these conditions are satisfied for c ≥ 1 when w > 0 and for 0 ≤ c < 1
when w ≥ 0. In either case, R = ∞. Similarly, with UvNM(·) a suitable normalized
CARA utility function, these conditions are satisfied with R = ∞.
Definition 2: For R ≥ 1, let FR be the set of distributions F (·) satisfying
(i) F (·) is a c.d.f. with support of the form [v, v], where 0 ≤ v < v < +∞,
(ii) F (·) admits R + 1 continuous derivatives on [v, v],
(iii) f(·) > 0 on [v, v].
These restrictions are weak with the exception of the finite upper bound v in (i). Relax-
ing (i) is possible but would involve more technical aspects in addition to allowing the
possibility of asymmetric equilibria. Altogether (i)–(iii) imply that f(·) is bounded away
from zero on [v, v].
Theorem 1: Let I ≥ 2 and R ≥ 1. Suppose that [U, F ] ∈ UR × FR, then there exists a
unique (symmetric) equilibrium and its equilibrium strategy s(·) satisfies:
(i) ∀v ∈ (v, v], s(v) < v, while s(v) = v,
(ii) ∀v ∈ [v, v], s′(v) > 0 with s′(v) = (I − 1)λ′(0)/[(I − 1)λ′(0) + 1] < 1,
(iii) s(·) admits R + 1 continuous derivatives on [v, v].
When the reserve price is nonbinding, existence of a pure equilibrium strategy follows
from Maskin and Riley (2000) and Athey (2001), while its uniqueness has been estab-
lished by Maskin and Riley (1996) using an argument similar to Lebrun (1999). The
main contribution of Theorem 1 is to derive the smoothness of the equilibrium strategy.
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Theorem 1 is an immediate consequence of the more general Theorem A1 in Appendix A,
which allows for exogenous variables. Moreover, the proof of Theorem A1 differs signifi-
cantly from previous work (e.g. Lebrun (1999), Lizzeri and Persico (2000)) and is based
on a functional approach viewing s(·) as a zero of a nonlinear operator. A Functional
Implicit Function Theorem and a continuation argument then allow us to establish exis-
tence, uniqueness and smoothness of s(·), especially with respect to exogenous variables
as needed in estimation.
Except for some particular choices for U(·) and F (·), the equilibrium strategy does
not have an explicit form. In practice, the integral form of the differential equation (2)




{s(x) + λ(x− s(x))} dF I−1(x).
This form can be also written as s(v) = sN(v) +
∫ v
v
{λ(x − s(x)) − x + s(x)} dF I−1(x),
where sN(·) is the well-known equilibrium strategy in the risk neutral case derived by e.g.
Riley and Samuelson (1981). Because λ(u) ≥ u for u ≥ 0 (see below), it follows that the
equilibrium bid under risk aversion is strictly larger than under risk neutrality for v > v
as noted by Milgrom and Weber (1982).
3 General Nonidentification Results
In this section we address the problem of identification of the structure [U, F ] from ob-
servables. Specifically, we assume that the number I of bidders is observed, as is typically
the case in a first-price sealed-bid auction with a nonbinding reserve price. We also as-
sume that the distribution G(·) of an equilibrium bid is known. Knowledge of G(·) from
observed bids is an estimation problem, which is addressed in Section 6. Thus the identi-
fication problem reduces to whether the structure [U, F ] can be recovered uniquely from
the knowledge of (I,G). A related issue is whether any distribution G(·) for an observed
bid can be rationalized by a structure [U, F ] given I. Such a question is important in
itself as it is connected to the validity of the auction model under consideration.
Following Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) for the risk neutral case, we can express
the differential equation (2) using the distribution G(·) of an equilibrium bid. For every
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b ∈ [b, b] = [v, s(v)], we have G(b) = F (s−1(b)) = F (v) with density g(b) = f(v)/s′(v),
where v = s−1(b). Thus the differential equation (2) can be written equivalently as
1 = (I − 1) g(bi)
G(bi)
λ(vi − bi). (3)
Since U(·) ≥ 0 and U ′′(·) ≤ 0, we have λ′(·) = 1 − U(·)U ′′(·)/U ′2(·) ≥ 1. Thus λ(·) is
strictly increasing. Solving (3) for vi gives








≡ ξ(bi, U,G, I), (4)
where λ−1(·) denotes the inverse of λ(·). This equation expresses each bidder’s private
value as a function of its corresponding bid, the bid distribution, the number of bidders
and the utility function. Note that ξ(·) is the inverse of the bidding strategy s(·).
The equilibrium bid distribution G(·) satisfies some regularity properties, which are
implied by the smoothness of s(·) stated in Theorem 1 and the regularity assumptions on
[U, F ]. It is convenient to introduce the following definition.
Definition 3: For R ≥ 1, let GR be the set of distributions G(·) satisfying
(i) G(·) is a c.d.f. with support of the form [b, b], where 0 ≤ b < b < +∞,
(ii) G(·) admits R + 1 continuous derivatives on [b, b],
(iii) g(·) > 0 on [b, b],
(iv) g(·) admits R + 1 continuous derivatives on (b, b],
(v) limb↓b d
r[G(b)/g(b)]/dbr exists and is finite for r = 1, . . . , R + 1.
The regularity properties (i)–(iii) are similar to those of Definition 2 for F (·). They
imply that g(·) is bounded away from zero on [b, b] and limb↓bG(b)/g(b) = 0 so that
limb↓b ξ(b, U,G, I) = b. Properties (iv) and (v) are specific to the auction model. In
particular, (iv) says that g(·) is smoother than f(·), extending a similar property noted
by Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) for the risk neutral model. Combined with (iii)
and (iv), (v) implies that G(·)/g(·) is R + 1 continuously differentiable on [b, b].
The following lemma provides a necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizing
a distribution of observed bids by an IPV auction model with risk aversion. Hereafter,
we say that a distribution is rationalized by a risk averse auction model if there exists a
structure [U, F ] whose equilibrium bid distribution is identical to the given distribution.
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Lemma 1: Let I ≥ 2, R ≥ 1, and G(·) be the joint distribution of (b1, . . . , bI). There
exists an IPV auction model with risk aversion [U, F ] ∈ UR ×FR that rationalizes G(·) if
and only if
(i) G(b1, . . . , bI) =
∏I
i=1G(bi),
(ii) G(·) ∈ GR,
(iii) ∃λ : IR+ → IR+ with R+1 continuous derivatives on [0,+∞), λ(0) = 0 and λ′(·) ≥ 1
such that ξ′(·) > 0 on [b, b], where








Lemma 1 provides a necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizing an observed bid
distribution. The first condition is related to the use of the IPV paradigm and requires
that bids be independently and identically distributed in agreement with private values.
The second condition requires that the marginal observed bid distribution G(·) satisfies
the regularity assumptions embodied in the set GR of Definition 3. The third condition
arises from the fact that ξ(·, U,G, I) is the inverse of the equilibrium strategy, which is
strictly increasing. As shown in the proof of Lemma 1, if such a condition is satisfied,
then G(·) is rationalized by the structure [U, F ], where U(x) = exp
∫ x
1
(1/λ(t))dt and F (·)
is the distribution of ξ(b, U,G, I) with b ∼ G(·).8
The next proposition shows that any distribution G(·) ∈ GR can be rationalized by an
IPV auction model with a utility function displaying risk aversion.
Proposition 1: Let I ≥ 2 and R ≥ 1. Any distribution G(·) ∈ GR can be rationalized by
a CRRA structure with c ∈ [0, 1) as well as a CARA structure with both zero wealth and
a private value distribution in FR.
Proposition 1 is striking. First, it implies that the restriction (iii) in Lemma 1 for ratio-
nalizing a bid distribution by an IPV auction model with risk averse bidders is redundant
unlike Condition C2 in Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000, Theorem 1) for the risk neutral
case. Specifically, our proof indicates that we can always find a function λ(·) corresponding
to either a CRRA or CARA utility function so that (iii) is satisfied whenever G(·) ∈ GR.
8Because λ(x) ∼ λ′(0)x in the neighborhood of 0,
∫ 0
1
(1/λ(t))dt = −∞ so that U(0) = 0, as required
by Definition 1-(i).
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Alternatively, the IPV auction model with general risk aversion does not impose any re-
strictions on observed bids beyond their independence and the weak regularity conditions
embodied in GR.
Second, because a general risk aversion structure [U, F ] ∈ UR × FR leads to a bid
distribution G(·) ∈ GR by Lemma 1, Proposition 1 implies that there always exist a CARA
structure and a CRRA structure with zero wealth that are observationally equivalent to
[U, F ]. In other words, irrespective of initial wealth, the game theoretic auction model
with arbitrary risk aversion does not provide enough restrictions on observed bids to
discriminate it from a CRRA or a CARA model with zero wealth. Hence, without loss
of power for explaining bids, an analyst could consider either a CRRA or a CARA model
with zero wealth, provided these models are identified and can be estimated.
Because a risk neutral model is a special case of a risk averse model, it follows from
Proposition 1 that any risk neutral model is observationally equivalent to a risk averse
model such as a CRRA or a CARA model. An interesting question is whether the reverse
holds, i.e. whether any risk averse model is observationally equivalent to a risk neutral
model. This is not true.9 Thus, by allowing for risk aversion, one does enlarge the
set of rationalizable bid distributions relative to risk neutrality. As a matter of fact,
Proposition 1 says that allowing for very simple forms of risk aversion such as CRRA or
CARA rationalizes any bid distribution in GR.
A model is a set of structures [U, F ]. For instance, the CARA model (with regularityR)
is the set of structures [U, F ] where U(·) ∈ UCARAR ≡ {U(·) = UvNM(w+·)−UvNM(w);w ∈
9The following is an example with I = 2 of a CRRA structure that is not observationally equiv-








for b ∈ [1/2, 1], where x1 < x2 are roots of the equation −8x2 +11x−2 = 0
and k such that G(·) is continuous at b = 1/2. The corresponding density g(·) is flat on [0, 1/2] and sharply
increasing on [1/2, 1]. This distribution satisfies the regularity conditions of Definition 3 with R = 1.
Letting U(x) = x1−c gives λ(x) = x/(1 − c). The bid distribution G(·) can be rationalized by a CRRA
structure where the inverse bidding strategy is ξ(b, c,G) = b + (1 − c)G(b)/g(b) as soon as 2/5 < c < 1
by Lemma 1-(iii). On the other hand, from Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) the distribution G(·) is
rationalized by a risk neutral structure if and only if ξ(b,G) = b+G(b)/g(b) is strictly increasing. This




4 ) + 1 for 1/2 ≤ b ≤ 1. It can
be easily checked that this function is not strictly increasing. Hence there does not exist a risk neutral
structure that is observationally equivalent to the preceding CRRA structure.
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IR+, UvNM(·) ∈ UCARA} ∩ UR and F (·) ∈ FR. The sets UDARAR , UCRRAR and UDRRAR are
similarly defined. As suggested by Proposition 1, auction models with risk averse bidders
are nonidentified, in general. Hereafter, we say that a structure [U, F ] is nonidentified if
there exists another structure [Ũ , F̃ ] within the model under consideration that leads to
the same equilibrium bid distribution. If no such [Ũ , F̃ ] exists for any [U, F ], we say that
the model is (globally) identified.
Proposition 2: Let I ≥ 2 and R ≥ 1. Any structure [U, F ] ∈ UR ×FR is not identified.
Similarly, any structure [U, F ] in UDARAR ×FR, UDRRAR ×FR, UCARAR ×FR or UCRRAR ×FR
is not identified.
As shown by Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000), the IPV auction model with risk neutral
bidders is identified from observed bids. Thus the nonidentification of the general risk
aversion model UR×FR arises from the unknown utility function U(·), which is restricted
to the identity function under risk neutrality. The second part of Proposition 2 indicates
that restricting U(·) to be derived from the four well known families of utility functions is
still insufficient for achieving identification even if U(·) is restricted to a simple parametric
specification such as the CRRA model.
It is useful to understand the source of nonidentification by considering the CRRA
model with zero wealth.10 Hence, U(x) = x1−c with 0 ≤ c < 1 and F (·) ∈ FR. Let
G(·) be the corresponding equilibrium bid distribution. Consider the alternative CRRA




















10For the general risk aversion model, where [U,F ] ∈ UR×FR with arbitrary wealth, let [Ũ , F̃ ] be such
that Ũ(·) = [U(·/α)/U(1/α)]α, with α ∈ (0, 1) and F̃ (·) be the distribution of















with b ∼ G(·), the equilibrium bid distribution under [U,F ]. The second equality follows from λ̃(·) ≡
Ũ(·)/Ũ ′(·) = U(·/α)/U ′(·/α) = λ(·/α). It is easy to check that [Ũ , F̃ ] ∈ UR × FR. Note that ξ̃(·) can
be decomposed as the sum of (1− α)b and αξ(b) = α[b+ λ−1(G(b)/(I − 1)g(b))], which are two strictly
increasing functions in b. Hence, ξ̃(·) is strictly increasing. Thus, from Lemma 1 the structures [U,F ]
and [Ũ , F̃ ] are observationally equivalent, i.e. lead to the same bid distribution G(·).
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where b ∼ G(·). Because the above function is strictly increasing in b when c < c̃ < 1,
then G(·) can also be rationalized by [Ũ , F̃ ]. Hence [Ũ , F̃ ] is observationally equivalent
to [U, F ]. This result contrasts with Donald and Paarsch (1996, Theorem 1), who state
that the CRRA model is identified. In fact, because of their assumption 1, these authors
restrict the distribution F̃ (·) to have the same support as F (·). In contrast, our result
shows that the CRRA model is not identified as F (·) and F̃ (·) may have different supports.
In particular, at b = b the above equation indicates that the support of F̃ (·) must shrink,
i.e. ṽ < v, to compensate for the increase in the constant relative risk aversion parameter
c̃ > c. More generally, all the quantiles of F̃ (·) are smaller than the corresponding ones
for F (·) by the same argument.
To summarize, considering risk aversion even under its simplest form such as CRRA
much increases the explanatory power of the model relative to the risk neutral case since
all bid distributions in GR can now be rationalized. On the other hand, the validity of such
a model can no longer be tested as the theory does not provide restrictions beyond the
independence of bids and the regularity conditions of GR. Moreover, risk averse models as
simple as CRRA and CARA models are nonidentified from observed bids. In particular,
parameterizing the utility function is not sufficient for achieving identification. Additional
identifying restrictions are thus needed.
4 Semiparametric Identification
The purpose of this section is to exploit heterogeneity across auctioned objects com-
bined with palatable identifying restrictions to achieve semiparametric identification of
first-price auction models with risk averse bidders.11 Heterogeneity across objects is char-
acterized by a vector of observed variables Z, which can be discrete or continuous with
values z in Z ⊂ IRd. For instance, Z can include a dummy variable for the quality of
the auctioned object or a continuous variable indicating the object’s appraisal value. As
before, we assume that the number of bidders I ∈ I is observed, which can be either
constant or varying across auctions. Hereafter, we thus consider that private values are
11For instance, if v was known, Donald and Paarsch (1996) result would apply and the CRRA model
would be identified. Assuming that v is known is, however, very strong as v directly affects the risk
aversion parameter c because v = b+ (1− c)/[(I − 1)g(b)].
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drawn from the conditional distribution F (·|Z, I).12 Our preceding nonidentification re-
sults of risk averse models then hold when the whole structure depends on (Z, I) namely
[U, F ] = {[U(·|z, I), F (·|z, I)], z ∈ Z, I ∈ I}.
A first natural restriction is to require that the utility function U(·) be independent of
(Z, I). Hence risk aversion is independent of the characteristics of the auctioned objects
and the number of bidders. This is justified in the case studied here as bidders do not
face uncertainty about the quality and equivalent monetary value of the auctioned object.
Restricting U(·) to be independent of (Z, I) is, however, insufficient for identifying the
model as noted later. Thus we need to consider additional restrictions on both U(·) and
F (·|·, ·) to achieve identification. We impose the following ones.
Assumption A1: For I a subset of {2, 3, . . .} and R ≥ 1,
(i) U(·) = U(·; θ) ∈ UR for every θ ∈ Θ ⊂ IRp,
(ii) F (·|·, ·) ∈ FR(Z × I) ≡ {F (·|·, ·) : F (·|z, I) ∈ FR,∀(z, I) ∈ Z × I}. The support of
F (·|z, I) is denoted [v(z, I), v(z, I)],
(iii) For some α ∈ (0, 1], the α-quantile vα(z, I) of F (·|z, I) satisfies vα(z, I) = vα(z, I; γ)
for all (z, I) ∈ Z × I and some γ ∈ Γ ⊂ IRq,
(iv) The function ψα(z, I; θ, γ) ≡ λ(vα(z, I; γ)− bα(z, I); θ) for (z, I) ∈ Z × I determines
uniquely (θ, γ) ∈ Θ×Γ, where bα(z, I) is the α-quantile of the equilibrium bid distribution
G(·|z, I) generated by the structure [U, F ].
Condition (i) requires that U(·) belongs to a parametric family of utility functions that
are smooth. Utility functions derived from CRRA and CARA vNM utility functions
satisfy such a condition with R = ∞. It is also satisfied by many parametric families
that allow for flexible patterns of risk aversion. Note that if initial wealth w is unknown,
then w must be included in the parameter vector θ. Condition (ii) requires that the
conditional distribution F (·|z, I) satisfies the regularity conditions of Definition 2 for
every (z, I) ∈ Z × I.
12Such a specification allows for unobserved heterogeneity across objects provided I is a sufficient
statistic for such unobserved heterogeneity conditional upon Z. See Campo, Perrigne and Vuong (2002).
Note that unobserved heterogeneity across bidders is allowed through differences in bidders’ private values.
On the other hand, observed heterogeneity across bidders is ruled out as it leads to an asymmetric auction
model. See Campo, Perrigne, and Vuong (2002) where bidders are ex ante different under risk neutrality.
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Condition (iii) is a parametric conditional quantile restriction on F (·|z, I), as fre-
quently used in the semiparametric literature. See Powell (1994). For instance, vα(·, ·; γ)
can be chosen to be a constant or more generally a polynomial, where γ is the vector of
unknown coefficients. Note that α = 1 is allowed, in which case a parametric specification
of the upper bound v(z, I) is considered. On the other hand, no assumption is made on
the lower bound v(z, I) corresponding to α = 0 as v(z, I) is nonparametrically identified
from the boundary condition v(z, I) = b(z, I). An alternative identifying assumption to
(iii) would be to require that the difference vα(z, I) − v(z, I) is a parametric function of
(z, I). This is equivalent to imposing a restriction on the α-quantile as the lower bound-
ary v(z, I) can be recovered from b(z, I). In particular when α = 1, vα(z, I) = v(z, I),
in which case this alternative identifying assumption would correspond to a parametric
specification of the length v(z, I)− v(z, I) of the support of F (·|z, I).
Condition (iv) is a standard identifying condition of the parameter vector (θ, γ) from
the knowledge of the function ψα(·, ·; θ, γ) on Z × I. It implies the “order” condition
Card Z × I ≥ p + q. Condition (iv) bears on [U,G], where G implicitly depends on the
structure [U, F ]. In particular, it can be easily verified. For instance, consider a CRRA
model with zero wealth and a constant (unknown) α-quantile of F (·|·, ·), i.e. vα(z, I) = γ,
in which case p = 1 and q = 1. Condition (iv) is then satisfied as soon as there are two
α-quantiles bα(z1, I1) and bα(z2, I2) that differ as shown in Proposition 3.
The next proposition establishes the semiparametric identification of the first-price
auction model with risk averse bidders. It relies upon the key equation (4) giving
the inverse of the equilibrium strategy, taking into account the conditioning variables
(Z, I), the parameterization of the utility function U(·; θ) and the α-quantile vα(z, I) of
F (·|z, I). Specifically, because the equilibrium strategy s(·, U, F, I) is strictly increasing,
then bα(z, I) = s(vα(z, I), U, F, I). Hence, (4) evaluated at the α-quantile bα(z, I) gives




λ(vα(z, I; γ)− bα(z, I); θ)
, (5)
for any (z, I) ∈ Z × I, where λ(·; θ) = U(·; θ)/U ′(·; θ). This equation combined with
(iv) suggests how the parameter vector (θ, γ) can be identified given the knowledge of
g(bα(z, I)|z, I), and the specified parametric forms for λ(·; θ) and vα(·; γ).
Proposition 3: The semiparametric model defined as the set of structures [U, F ] satis-
fying Assumption A1 is identified. In particular, if there exists (zj, Ij) ∈ Z × I, j = 1, 2,
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such that bα(z1, I1) 6= bα(z2, I2), then the CRRA model and the CARA model with zero
wealth, a constant conditional quantile restriction vα = γ and F (·|·, ·) ∈ FR(Z × I) are
semiparametrically identified.
Proposition 3 provides a semiparametric identification result since U(·) is parametrically
identified through θ while F (·|·) is nonparametrically identified subject to its paramet-
ric conditional quantile restriction. Moreover, the proof shows that the parameter γ is
identified. Note that in the CRRA and CARA models with zero wealth and a constant
quantile restriction, the additional requirement that the α-quantile bα(z, I) varies with
(z, I) is readily verifiable. For instance, suppose that I does not vary, while Z is re-
duced to one dichotomous variable indicating e.g. the quality of the auctioned object.
The CRRA model is then identified if the α-quantiles of the conditional bid distributions
corresponding to the two values of Z differ.
It is worthnoting that parameterizing the utility function and the α-quantile of the
distribution of private values arises naturally. In particular, dropping either one of these
parameterizations would lead to a nonidentified model as the following examples indi-
cate. For instance, assume that the conditional quantile vα(z, I) is left unspecified, but
a parametric specification for the utility function is retained. Specifically, consider the
semiparametric model composed of the structures [U, F ] satisfying A1-(i,ii). Such a model
would not be necessarily identified. An example is the CRRA model with U(x) = x1−c
for c ∈ [0, 1) and F (·|·, ·) belonging to FR(Z × I). The argument is similar to that
given after Proposition 2, where G(·) and g(·) are replaced by G(·|·, ·) and g(·|·, ·), respec-
tively. Hence, restricting the utility function to be parametric does not achieve by itself
identification of the semiparametric model, despite that U(·) does not vary with (Z, I).
Likewise, suppose that the restriction to a parametric specification of the utility func-
tion is relaxed while the parametric conditional quantile restriction is retained. That
is, consider the semiparametric model composed of structures [U, F ] satisfying A1-(ii,iii)
with U(·) ∈ UR. This model is not necessarily identified. Specifically, let [U, F ] be such a




δ for 0 ≤ x < δ2,
c2U(x+ δ(1− δ)) for x ≥ δ2,
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where 0 < δ < 1, c1 = c2[U(δ)]
1−δ, and c2 = 1/U(1 + δ(1 − δ)).13 Let F̃ (·|z, I) be the
distribution of








where b ∼ G(·|z, I). It can be shown that [Ũ , F̃ ] rationalizes G(·|·, ·) and that F̃ (·|·, ·)
satisfies A1-(ii,iii).14 Hence, the parameterization of the conditional quantile of F (·|z, I)
is not sufficient by itself for identification.
5 Optimal Convergence Rate
The previous section has shown that the auction model with risk averse bidders is semi-
parametrically identified through a parameterization of the utility function and a para-
metric quantile restriction on the distribution of private values. This naturally leads to
the search for estimators of [U, F ], and in particular for semiparametric estimators of θ
as θ parameterizes U(·). ¿From the semiparametric literature, it is known that many
semiparametric estimators can attain the parametric rate of convergence, while others
converge at a slower rate. For the former, see Robinson (1988) and Newey and McFadden
(1994) and Powell (1994) for surveys. For the latter, see Manski (1985), Horowitz (1992),
13Note that Ũ(0) = 0, and Ũ(·) has R+ 2 continuous derivatives on (0, δ)∪ (δ,+∞). Thus Ũ(·) would
belong to UR if Ũ(·) has R + 2 continuous derivatives at x = δ2. In fact, Ũ(·) has only one continuous
derivative at x = δ2. Hence Ũ(·) should be smoothed out in the neighborhood of x = δ2 to be R + 2
continuously differentiable on (0,+∞). We omit this smoothing requirement and use Ũ(·) directly.
14From Lemma 1, we need to show that ξ̃′(·|z, I) > 0 for any (z, I) ∈ Z × I. We have
ξ̃(b|z, I) =
{
(1− δ)b+ δξ(b|z, I) if G(b|z, I)/[(I − 1)g(b|z, I)] ≤ λ(δ),
ξ(b|z, I)− δ(1− δ) if G(b|z, I)/[(I − 1)g(b|z, I)] ≥ λ(δ).
Because ξ′(·|z, I) is strictly positive, ξ̃′(·|z, I) is strictly positive as required. Hence [Ũ , F̃ ] rationalizes
the bid distribution G(·|·, ·). It remains to show that F̃ (·|·, ·) satisfies A1-(iii). The α-quantile ṽα(z, I) of
F̃ (·|z, I) satisfies ṽα(z, I) = ξ̃(bα(z, I)|z, I). Consider G(bα(z, I)|z, I)/[(I − 1)g(bα(z, I)|z, I)] = α/[(I −
1)g(bα(z, I)|z, I)]. Because λ(·) is strictly increasing with λ(0) = 0, there exists δ sufficiently small so
that 0 < λ(δ) < α/ sup(z,I)∈Z×I [(I − 1)g(bα(z, I)|z, I)], where the latter is assumed to be finite. Thus
ṽα(z, I) = ξ(bα(z, I)|z, I) − δ(1 − δ) = vα(z, I) − δ(1 − δ) > 0 for δ sufficiently small. Hence ṽα(z, I)
satisfies A1-(iii) whenever vα(z, I; γ) contains a constant term.
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Kyriazidou (1997) and Honoré and Kyriazidou (2000). Given the nonstandard nature of
our model, it is especially useful to derive the optimal (best) convergence rate that can be
attained by semiparametric estimators of θ. This is the primary purpose of this section.
The optimal convergence rate for estimating the conditional density f(·|·, ·) will follow
from Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000).
We first need to strengthen our regularity assumptions on F (·|·, ·) and U(·; ·) with
respect to (z, I) and θ. Regarding F (·|·, ·), we introduce the following definition, which
parallels Definition 2 taking into account the conditioning variables (Z, I).
Definition 4: For R ≥ 1 and some unknown v and v, 0 ≤ v < v < +∞, let F∗R ≡
F∗R(Z × I) be the set of conditional distributions F (·|·, ·) satisfying
(i) ∀(z, I) ∈ Z × I, v(z, I) = v and v(z, I) = v,
(ii) ∀I ∈ I, F (·|·, I) admits R + 1 continuous derivatives on [v, v]×Z,
(iii) ∀I ∈ I, inf(v,z)∈[v,v]×Z f(v|z, I) > 0.
While conditions (ii) and (iii) are straightforward extensions of their counterparts in Def-
inition 2, condition (i) needs further discussion. Because of the singularity of the differ-
ential equation (2) at the lower boundary of the support of the private value distribution,
assuming a constant lower boundary v(z, I) = v simplifies the proof of Theorem A1 es-
tablishing the smoothness of the equilibrium strategy s(·) with respect to (v, z), which
is needed to obtain the smoothness of the equilibrium bid distribution. On the other
hand, such a restriction is not used in estimation as v(z, I) can be recovered from b(z, I).
Regarding the upper boundary restriction, Section 4 indicates that a parameterization of
a quantile of F (·|·, ·) is necessary for achieving identification. The upper boundary is a
particular quantile corresponding to α = 1. Our estimation procedure will rely on (5),
which requires an estimate for bα(z, I). There is then an important difference between
estimating a quantile corresponding to α ∈ (0, 1) and estimating the upper boundary. In
particular, the convergence rate for estimating the latter is much faster than for estimat-
ing the former. This suggests that the optimal convergence rate for estimating θ cannot
be faster when considering an α-quantile restriction with α ∈ (0, 1) than when considering
the upper boundary. Hereafter, we thus focus on α = 1, and for sake of simplicity, we
consider a constant upper boundary so that q = 1. In other words, we assume a common
19
but unknown support for the distributions F (·|z, I), where (z, I) ∈ Z × I.15
It will be useful to derive the smoothness properties of the equilibrium bid distribution
G(·|·, ·) corresponding to a structure [U, F ] in UR × F∗R. Such properties are important
as they relate to the implied statistical model for the observables, which are the bids,
the number of bidders and the exogenous variables. They follow from Theorem A1,
which establish the existence, uniqueness and smoothness of the equilibrium strategy
with respect to (v, z) in [v, v]×Z for every i ∈ I.16
Lemma 2: Let I ⊂ {2, 3, . . .}, R ≥ 1 and Z be a rectangular compact of IRd with
nonempty interior. For every I ∈ I, the conditional distribution G(·|·, I) corresponding
to a structure [U, F ] ∈ UR ×F∗R satisfies
(i) The upper boundary b(z, I) admits R+ 1 continuous derivatives with respect to z ∈ Z
and infz∈Z(b(z, I)− b(z, I) > 0, where b(z, I) = v,
(ii) G(·|·, I) admits R + 1 continuous partial derivatives on SI(G) ≡ {(b, z); z ∈ Z, b ∈
[b(z, I), b(z, I)]},
(iii) g(b|z, I) > cg > 0 for all (b, z) ∈ SI(G),
(iv) g(·|·, I) admits R + 1 continuous partial derivatives on SuI (G) ≡ {(b, z); z ∈ Z, b ∈
(b(z, I), b(z, I)]},
(v) limb↓b(z,I) ∂
r[G(b|z, I)/g(b|z, I)]/∂br exists and is finite for r = 1, . . . , R+1 and z ∈ Z.
Lemma 2 extends Lemma 1-(ii) to the case with exogenous variables (Z, I). It parallels
Proposition 1 in Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) for the risk neutral case.
In view of the above, we then consider the semiparametric model composed of struc-
tures [U, F ] satisfying the following assumption.
Assumption A2: Let I ⊂ {2, 3, . . .}, R ≥ 1 and Z be a rectangular compact of IRd with
nonempty interior.
(i) In addition to A1-(i), U(·; ·) is R + 2 continuously differentiable on (0,+∞)×Θ,
(ii) F (·|·, ·) ∈ F∗R,
(iii) The function ψ1(z, I; θ, v) ≡ λ(v − b(z, I); θ) for (z, I) ∈ Z × I determines uniquely
15When there are no exogenous variables Z, assuming that F (·|I)s have a common support agrees with
the theoretical assumption that the private value distribution is independent of the number of bidders.
16To simplify the presentation, we exclude discrete exogenous variables by requiring Z to have a
nonempty interior. Our next results continue to hold with suitable modifications.
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(θ, v) ∈ Θ×(0,+∞), where b(z, I) is the upper boundary of the equilibrium bid distribution
G(·|z, I) generated by the structure [U, F ] with I bidders.
Conditions (i) and (ii) strengthen A1-(i,ii,iii) of A1. Condition (iii) simply expresses
A1-(iv) at the upper boundary under a constant restriction. Then (5) becomes
g(b(z, I)|z, I) = 1
I − 1
1
λ(v − b(z, I); θ)
, (6)
for all (z, I) ∈ Z × I. Let β = (θ, v).
It remains to specify the data generating process. For the `th auction, one observes
all the bids Bi`, i = 1, . . . , I`, the number of bidders I` ≥ 2 as well as the d-dimensional
vector Z` characterizing the heterogeneity of the auctioned objects. This gives a total
number N =
∑L
`=1 I` of bids, where L is the number of auctions. Thus f(·|Z`, I`) is
the density of private values conditional upon (Z`, I`) in auction `. Following the game
theoretical model of Section 2, we make the following assumption on the data generating
process and the specification of the semiparametric model composed of structures [U, F ]
satisfying A2.
Assumption A3:
(i) The variables (Z`, I`), ` = 1, 2 . . . are independently and identically distributed with
support Z × I, where I is finite and 0 < inf(z,I)∈Z×I g(z, I) ≤ sup(z,I)∈Z×I g(z, I) < +∞,
(ii) For every `, the private values Vi`, i = 1, . . . , I` are independently and identically
distributed conditionally upon (Z`, I`) as F0(·|Z`, I`),
(iii) The semiparametric model is correctly specified, i.e. the true utility function U0(·)
and conditional distribution F0(·|·, ·) satisfy Assumption A2 for some θ0 ∈ Θ and 0 ≤
v0 < v0 < +∞.
In particular, private values and hence bids are independent across auctions.17
We are now in a position to establish the optimal rate at which β = (θ, v) can be esti-
mated. As in Horowitz (1993), we invoke the minimax theory developed by e.g. Ibragimov
and Has’minskii (1981). We consider the following norms
||β||∞ = max( max
1≤k≤p





17Not all of A3 is used to prove Theorem 2. In particular, (Z`, I`) need not be independently and
identically distributed. Furthermore, A3-(i) can be weakened allowing Z`s not to be independently and
identically distributed as Theorem 3 is derived conditionally upon (Z1, I1, . . . , Z`, I`).
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and define the set of conditional densities
F∗R(M) =
{







for M > 0. As usual in studies of convergence rates, one considers a neighborhood of the
true parameters (β0, f0) in order to exclude superefficiency, i.e.
Vε(β0, f0) = {(β, f) ∈ Θ× (0,+∞)×F∗R(M); ‖β − β0‖∞ < ε,
‖(f(·|·, ·)− f0(·|·, ·))1I(f(·|·, ·)f0(·|·, ·) > 0)‖∞ < ε},
where the indicator function restricts comparison of conditional densities on the intersec-
tion of their supports. Let Prβ,f be the joint distribution of the Vi`s and the (Z`, I`)s under
(θ, f, fZ,I), where fZ,I is the joint density of the (Z`, I`)s. The next theorem establishes
an upper bound for the optimal rate when estimating β0. It crucially relies on Lemmas 1
and 2 and Proposition 3. Let Θo denote the interior of Θ.
Theorem 2: Under Assumptions A2-A3, for any β0 ∈ Θo × (0,+∞), any f0 ∈ F∗R(M)
and any deterministic sequence ρN such that ρNN
−(R+1)/(2R+3) → +∞, there exists a











‖ρN(β̃N − β)‖∞ ≥ tN
)
≥ 1/2,
for any t ≥ 0, where the infimum is taken over all possible estimators β̃N of β based upon
(Bi`, Z`, I`), i = 1, . . . , I`, ` = 1, . . . , L.
Theorem 2 reveals the nonparametric nature of the parameter β, which cannot be esti-
mated at a faster rate than N (R+1)/(2R+3). More precisely, for any estimator β̃N , Theorem
2 shows that ρN(β̃N − β) diverges with probability at least 1/2. Thus ρN diverges too
fast and β cannot be estimated at a rate faster than N (R+1)/(2R+3), and hence at the
parametric rate ρN =
√
N . On the other hand, Theorem 3 in the next section will show
that there exists an estimator β̂N that converges at the rate N
(R+1)/(2R+3). Therefore, the
optimal rate of convergence for estimating β0 in the minimax sense is N
(R+1)/(2R+3), i.e.
N2/5 when R = 1, which is independent of the dimension d of the exogenous variables Z.
The main idea of the proof is to introduce some perturbations of the true parameters
(β0, f0). For instance, when R = 1, we consider the bid density







where ψ : IR− → IR is compactly supported with ψ(0) = 1, and
∫
ψ(x)dx = 0, while




λ(v − b0(z, I); θ)
, (7)
κ > 0, and ‖βN − β0‖∞ = O(1/ρN). Using Lemmas 1 and 2, we first establish that each
such density can be rationalized by an auction model with (βN , fN(·|·, ·)) ∈ Vε(β0, f0) for
ρN sufficiently large. We then show that the probability distributions of the Bi`s under
gN(·|·, ·) and g0(·|·, ·) cannot be distinguished statistically from each other.
6 Semiparametric Estimation
This section proposes a semiparametric procedure for estimating (i) the parameter θ
characterizing the bidders’ utility function U(·; θ) and hence bidders’ risk aversion, and
(ii) the conditional latent density f(·|·, ·) of bidders’ private values. Because we do not
restrict f(·|·, ·) to belong to a parametric family, the estimation problem is semiparametric.
A first subsection presents our semiparametric procedure and its different steps, while a
second subsection establishes the asymptotic properties of our estimator of θ.
6.1 A Semiparametric Procedure
Our semiparametric procedure follows closely the semiparametric identification result. By
(6) and (7), it relies on the identifying relation




λ(v0 − b0(z, I); θ0)
= m(z, I; β0), ∀(z, I) ∈ Z × I, (8)
where the subscript 0 indicates quantities at the truth. If one knew the upper boundary
b0(·, ·) and the density g0(·|·, ·), one could recover the utility function parameters θ0 from
(8) given the chosen parametric form for λ(·; ·). From the knowledge of G0(·|·, ·) and
θ0, one could then recover every bidder’s private value vi from (4) to estimate f0(·|·, ·).
Unfortunately, b0(·, ·), G0(·|·, ·) and g0(·|·, ·) are unknown, but they can be estimated from
observed bids. This suggests the following three steps procedure:
• Step 1: From observed bids, estimate nonparametrically b0(·, ·) and g0(b0(·, ·)|·, ·) at
the observed values (Z`, I`),
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• Step 2: Using (8), where g0(b0(Z`, I`)|Z`, I`) and b0(Z`, I`) are replaced by their
estimates obtained in the first step, estimate β0 ≡ (θ0, v0) using NLLS,
• Step 3: Using (4), where G0(·|·, ·), g0(·|·, ·) and λ(·; θ0) are replaced by their non-
parametric estimators and λ(·; θ̂N), recover the pseudo private values v̂i to estimate
nonparametrically f0(·|·, ·).
The next subsections detail each of these steps.
Nonparametric Boundary Estimation
This step consists in estimating the upper boundary b0(·, ·) of the bid distribution and
the conditional density g0(·|·, ·) at the upper boundary.
We first discuss the estimation of b0(·, ·). Fix I ∈ I. By Lemma 2-(i), the upper
boundary b0(·, I) is R + 1 continuously differentiable on Z. Following Korostelev and
Tsybakov (1993), one introduces a partition of Z into bins increasing with the number
of observations. The boundary estimator of b0(z, I) for z in an arbitrary bin is obtained
by minimizing the volume of the cylinder whose base is the bin and whose upper surface
is defined by a polynomial of degree R in z ∈ IRd subject to the constraint that the
observations are contained in such a cylinder. The optimal polynomial evaluated at z
gives the boundary estimate b̂N(z, I). Under appropriate vanishing size ∆N of the bins,
namely ∆N ∝ (logN/N)1/(R+1+d), the resulting piecewise polynomial estimator converges
to b0(·, I) uniformly on Z at the rate (N/ logN)(R+1)/(R+1+d), which is strictly faster that√
N whenever R ≥ d.
For instance, for R = 1 and d = 1, partition Z = [z, z] into kN bins {Zk; k = 1, . . . , kN}
of equal length ∆N ∝ (logN/N)1/3. On each Zk = [zk, zk), the estimate of the upper





ak + bk(z − zk)dz = ak∆N + bk∆2N/2.
This estimator converges at the uniform rate (N/ logN)2/3, which is strictly faster than
√
N and sufficient for our purpose.
Turning to the estimation of the density g(·|·, ·) at the upper boundary, it is well-known
that standard kernel density estimators suffer from bias at boundary points. To minimize
such boundary effects, we consider a one-sided kernel density estimator. Specifically, let
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Φ(·) be a one-sided kernel with support [−1, 0] satisfying some conditions, which include∫
Φ(x)dx = 1 and
∫
xrΦ(x)dx = 0 for r = 1, . . . , R (see Assumption 4-(iii)). For every


















where hN is some bandwidth. Lemma D1 shows that Yi` is an asymptotically unbiased
estimator of g0(b0(Z`, I`)|Z`, I`) given (Z`, I`) as hN vanishes.18 In practice, one does not
know b0(·, ·). We thus define Ŷi` similarly to Yi`, where b0(·, ·) is replaced by its estimator
b̂N(·, ·) obtained previously.
Semiparametric Estimation of θ0
Let FL be the σ-field generated by Z`, ` = 1, . . . , L. In view of (8)-(9) we consider the
identity
Yi` = m(Z`, I`; β0) + ei` + εi`, (10)
where ei` ≡ E[Yi`|FL]−m(Z`, I`, β0) and εi` = Yi`−E[Yi`|FL]. Lemma D1 shows that the
bias term ei` = O(h
R+1
N ), while the variance of the error term εi` is an O(1/hN), namely,
Var[εi`|FL] =




Hence, the Yi`s obey a regression model with a vanishing bias and a variance of the error
term diverging to infinity as hN vanishes. These features raise some technical difficulties
when deriving the asymptotic properties of our estimator of θ. In particular, the diverging
variance of the error term is the main reason why our estimator does not achieve the
parametric rate
√
N of convergence. Specifically, its rate N (R+1)/(2R+3) is smaller than
√
N but is optimal in the minimax sense in view of Section 5.






ω(Z`, I`)[Yi` −m(Z`, I`; β)]2 (12)
18Note that Y ` = (1/I`)
∑I`
`=1 Yi` has a kernel type form with a one-sided kernel, though I` remains
bounded and hence does not increase with N in our case.
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with respect to β = (θ, v) ∈ Bδ, where the ω(Z`, I`)s are strictly positive weights. The set
Bδ is defined as Bδ = {(θ, v); θ ∈ Θ, sup(z,I)∈Z×I b0(z, I) + δ ≤ v ≤ vsup} for some δ > 0
and vsup > 0. The set Bδ is introduced to bound m(·, ·; β) away from 0 (see Lemma C1).
Because b0(·, ·) and hence m(·, ·; β) are unknown, the preceding estimator is infeasible.
We thus replace b0(·, ·) by its estimator obtained in Step 1. Thus, our estimator of β is













, BN ={(θ, v); θ ∈ Θ, max
1≤`≤L
b̂N(Z`, I`)+δ/2 ≤ v ≤ vsup}.
Nonparametric Estimation of f(·|·)
This step is similar to the second step in Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) with the
difference that λ(·; θ0) in (4) is now estimated using the estimator θ̂N of θ0 in Step 2, while
λ(·) was known and equal to the identity in that paper.
Specifically, we first need an estimate of the ratio G0(·|·, ·)/g0(·|·, ·) evaluated at
(Bi`, Z`, I`). For an arbitrary (b, z, I), the ratio G0(b|z, I)/g0(b|z, I) is estimated by

























where KG(·) and Kg(·) are kernels of order R + 1 with bounded supports, and hG and
hg are bandwidths vanishing at the rates (N/ logN)
1/(2R+d+2) and (N/ logN)1/(2R+d+3),
respectively. The pseudo private values are then





ψ̂(Bi`, Z`, I`); θ̂N
)
,
if (Bi`, Z`) + S(2hG) ⊂ Ŝ(GI`) and (Bi`, Z`) + S(2hg) ⊂ Ŝ(GI`). Otherwise, we let
V̂i` be infinity, which corresponds to a trimming. The sets S(2hG) and S(2hg) are the
supports of KG(·/(2hG)) and Kg(·/(2hg)), respectively. The set ŜI(G) is the estimated
support of the conditional bid distribution G0(·|·, I). Specifically, ŜI(G) = {(b, z) : b ∈
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[b̂N(z, I), b̂N(z, I)], z ∈ Z}, where b̂N(·, I) is the previous boundary estimator and b̂N(·, I)
is defined similarly.
The N pseudo private values V̂i` hence obtained are used in a standard kernel estima-























whereKf (·) andKZ(·) are kernels of order R and R+1 with bounded supports, and hf and
hZ are bandwidths vanishing at the rates (N/ logN)
1/(2R+d+3) and (L/ logL)1/(2R+d+2).
Because our semiparametric estimator θ̂N converges at a faster rate, as shown in the
next section, it follows from Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) that f̂(·|·) is uniformly
consistent on compact subsets of its support at the rate (N/ logN)R/(2R+d+3). Moreover,
the latter is the optimal rate for estimating f0(·|·) from observed bids.
6.2 Asymptotic Properties
In this section, we derive the asymptotic properties of our estimator of θ0. In particular,
we show that our semiparametric estimator θ̂N converges at the rate N
(R+1)/(2R+3), which
is independent of the dimension of Z. In view of Theorem 2, it follows that the optimal
rate for estimating θ0 is N
(R+1)/(2R+3) and that θ̂N converges at this optimal rate.
We make the next assumptions on δ, (θ0, v0), the weights ω(·, ·), the kernel Φ(·), the
bandwidth hN and the rate of uniform convergence a
−1
N of the boundary estimator b̂N(·, ·).
Assumption A4:
(i) δ is such that 0 < δ < v0 − sup(z,I)∈Z×I b0(z, I). Moreover, (θ0, v0) belongs to Θo ×
(0, vsup) for some vsup <∞, where Θ is a compact of IRp, and
Span(z,I)∈Z×I
{




(ii) The weight functions ω(·, ·) are uniformly bounded away from zero and infinity, i.e.
inf(z,I)∈Z×I ω(z, I) > 0 and sup(z,I)∈Z×I ω(z, I) <∞,
19As in Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000), we focus on the conditional density f0(v|z), though similar
results are obtained for f0(v|z, I).
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(iii) The kernel Φ(·) is continuously differentiable on IR− with support [−1, 0] and satisfies∫
Φ(x)dx = 1,
∫
xjΦ(x)dx = 0 for j = 1, . . . , R,
(iv) hN = o(1) with NhN →∞,









Regarding the first part of Assumption A4-(i), recall that sup(z,I)∈Z×I b0(z, I) < v0
by Theorem 1-(i), Lemma 2-(i) and the compactness of Z × I. The second part of
Assumption A4-(i) is standard in parametric estimation. In particular, it strengthens the
identification requirement of β0 from the parametric specification m(·, ·; β). For instance,
it implies that b0(z, I) must have at least p+ 1 different values. As shown in Lemma D5,
















Iω2(z, I)m(z, I; β)
∂m(z, I; β)
∂β




are of full rank in a neighborhood of β0.
Assumptions A4-(iii,iv) are standard in kernel estimation when using higher order
kernels though our kernel is one-sided. Assumption A4-(v) requires that the boundary
estimator b̂N(·, ·) converges faster than the semiparametric estimator θ̂N (see Theorem
3-(i) for the latter) so that estimation of the boundary does not affect the asymptotic
distribution of θ̂N . For instance, when R = 1 and d = 1, we have aN = (logN/N)
2/3 from
Korostelev and Tsybakov (1993) (see previous subsection). If hN is exactly of order N
−1/5,
which gives the optimal convergence rate of θ̂N by Theorems 2 and 3, then Assumption
A4-(v) is satisfied. More generally, when d ≥ 1 and hN is exactly of the optimal order
N−1/(2R+3), it is easily checked that R ≥ d is sufficient for the convergence rate a−1N =
(N/ logN)(R+1)/(R+1+d) of the boundary estimator b̂N(·, ·) to satisfy Assumption A4-(v).














2(Z`, I`)m(Z`, I`; β)
∂m(Z`, I`; β)
∂β




which, when normalized by N , are consistent estimators of A(β) and B(β) as shown in
Lemma D5. Since m(·, ·; β) is unknown, let ÂN(β) and B̂N(β) be defined as AN(β) and
















which gives the asymptotic bias of our estimator.
The next result establishes the consistency and asymptotic normality of β̂N . It also
provides its rate of convergence and an estimator of its asymptotic variance.
Theorem 3: Under Assumptions A2–A4,
(i) β̂N is a consistent estimator of β0 with







so the best rate of convergence of β̂N is N
(R+1)/(2R+3), which is achieved when the exact
































Moreover, consistent estimators of A(β0) and B(β0) are N
−1ÂN(β̂N) and N
−1B̂N(β̂N)).
On technical grounds, the proof of Theorem 3-(i) is complicated by the divergence of
the variance (11) of the error term εi` in the nonlinear model (10). In particular, omitting
the estimation of the upper boundary b(·, ·), which has no effect by Assumption A4-(v),
(1/N)QN(β) = OP(1/hN) because of the diverging variance. Hence, (1/N)QN(β) does
not have a finite limit. This would lead to consider the normalization hNQN(β)/N , but
its limit is a constant independent of β. To overcome such a difficulty, we show that




I`ω(Z`, I`)[m(Z`, I`; β)−m(Z`, I`; β0)]2. (19)
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Consistency of β̂ can then be established by standard arguments using the objective
function QN(β) (see, e.g. White (1994)).
Theorem 3-(ii,iii) gives the asymptotic distribution of β̂N − β0 and its rate of conver-












This expansion corresponds to the usual bias/variance decomposition of nonparametric
estimators (see e.g. Härdle and Linton (1994)). When Nh2R+3N → 0, the leading term is














When Nh2R+3N → ∞, it is the first term, i.e. the bias. Thus, the best convergence rate
of β̂N is achieved when the variance and the bias are of the same order, i.e. when hN is
exactly of order N−1/(2R+3), in which case β̂N − β0 = OP (N−(R+1)/(2R+3)).20
The best convergence rate N (R+1)/(2R+3) of β̂N is independent of the dimension d of
Z and corresponds to the optimal rate for estimating an univariate density with R + 1
bounded derivatives. This seems surprising in view of the key relation (8), which suggests
that β0 is as difficult to estimate as the conditional density g0(·|·, ·), while the latter cannot
be estimated faster than N (R+1)/(2R+3+d) from Stone (1982) given the (R + 1) bounded
derivatives of g0(·|·, I). The faster rate N (R+1)/(2R+3) can be explained by noting that
(8) leads to the moment conditions E[{g0(b0(Z, I)|Z, I) − m(Z, I; β0)}W (Z, I)] = 0 for
any vector function W (·). Integrating with respect to Z intuitively improves the rate of
convergence by eliminating the Z dimension. Note that the previous moment conditions
are similar to those considered by Newey and McFadden (1994) though Assumptions (iii)-
(iv) of their Theorem 8.1 is not satisfied in our case. In fact, because the variance (11)
is diverging, our proof shows that the average gradient (1/N)∂Q̂N(β0)/∂β = OP(h
R+1 +
20When hN is optimally chosen, the estimator β̂N is asymptotically biased. In a similar problem,
Horowitz (1992) proposes a correction based on the estimation of the bias. See also Bierens (1987).
Another bias correction using a modification of the Yi`s could be based on Hengartner (1997). From
Liu and Brown (1993), however, such a bias correction cannot hold in the minimax sense of Theorem 2.
Because the limit results used in the proof hold uniformly with respect to (β, f) in a neighborhood of




NhN), which is different from the usual OP(1/
√
N). Hence, our estimator converges
at a slower rate than
√
N .
In practice, Theorem 3-(iii) is used to make inference on β0 as it gives an estimate of the






N (β̂N). Note that β̂N depends
on the weights ω(·, ·), which can be chosen optimally to decrease the asymptotic variance
of β̂N as in weighted NLLS. ¿From (11), the optimal weight function ω
∗(·, ·) is inversely
proportional to the variance, i.e. ω∗(·, ·) = 1/m(·, ·; β0). This optimal weighted NLLS
estimator β̂∗N can be implemented by a two-stage procedure, in which the optimal weights
are estimated by 1/m̂(·, ·; β̂N), where β̂N is obtained in the first step by ordinary NLLS.






N). This is the
best variance achievable in the regression model (10) with ei` = 0. An interesting question
is then the existence of an estimator based upon the Yi`s with a smaller asymptotic
variance in a local minimax sense.
7 Empirical Application
This section illustrates the previous methodology on timber auction sales from the US
Forest Service. A first subsection briefly presents the data. A second subsection discusses
the implementation of our estimation method for a CRRA utility specification and gives
the estimation results. In particular, risk aversion is found to be significant.
7.1 Data
The US Forest Service (USFS) timber auction data have been widely used in empirical
studies on auctions. Comparing revenues generated from ascending and sealed-bid auc-
tions, Hansen (1985) tests the revenue equivalence theorem. Adopting an independent
private value framework, Baldwin, Marshall and Richard (1997) study collusion, while
Baldwin (1995) attempts to test for the presence of risk aversion. More recently, Athey
and Levin (2001) study the practice of skewed bidding when bidders bid on species and
when payments are based on actual harvested value. Their analysis suggests that bidders
are risk averse. Haile (2001) analyzes the bidding behavior when there are resale oppor-
tunities after the auctions. Each of these papers focuses on a particular economic issue.
31
While bidders’ risk aversion is suspected in two of them, the extent of risk aversion has
not been measured. The objective of our application is to shed some light on bidders’ risk
aversion. For this reason, many characteristics of these auctions such as collusion, skewed
bidding and resale markets are left aside to focus on the issue of risk aversion.
The Western half of the United States has a large part of its forestry publicly owned
and is an important provider of timber in the country.21 The Forest Service uses both oral
ascending and first-price sealed-bid auctions for selling its standing timber. We focus here
on the first-price sealed-bid auctions for the year 1979. There is a total of 378 auctions
involving a total of 1,400 sealed bids from sawmills.
The data contain a set of variables characterizing each timber lot on sale varying from
the various species included in the lot, the estimated volume measured in mbf, the logging
cost in dollars, the acreage of the lot, the term of the contract measured in months, the
month during which the auction was held, the location of the lot, the total reserve price
in dollars and the appraisal value in dollars. The latter is an estimated value of the lot
provided by the USFS taking into account the quality and quantity of timber. In addition
to these variables, the data provide the number of bidders who have submitted a sealed bid
as well as their bid in dollars and their identities. Table 1 gives some summary statistics
on the bids per mbf, the winning bid per mbf, the reserve price per mbf, the appraisal
value per mbf, the volume in mbf, the density computed as the ratio of the volume per
acre, the acreage and the number of bidders.
The auctioned lots display important heterogeneity in size and quality. When re-
gressing the logarithm of bids per mbf on a complete set of variables characterizing the
auctioned lot including region dummies and seasonality effects, only two variables are
strongly significant, namely the number of bidders and the appraisal value. As expected,
a larger number of bidders increases competition and therefore the bids, while bids are
increasing in the lot value.22 Thus, the appraisal value seems to be the best candidate
to capture the heteregoneity across auctioned objects. Such a feature has been already
21The data analyzed here come from Regions 1 to 6, covering the states of Idaho, Montana, North and
South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Colorado, Wisconsin, Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, California,
Oregon and Washington.
22A quadratic term has been included as well to capture a decrease after some value for the number of
bidders as predicted by the common value model. It is not significant.
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observed in previous empirical studies, see e.g. Haile (2001).
Table 1: Some Summary Statistics
Variable Mean STD Min Max
Bids 97.28 71.51 1.05 665.18
Winning Bid 117.03 88.67 4.37 665.18
Reserve Price 62.95 46.01 1.00 217.36
Appraisal Value 57.07 45.41 1.00 199.58
Volume 1,621.93 3,153,48 11.00 23,500.00
Density 2.05 5.17 0.002 46.43
Acreage 1,348.35 3,590.69 1.00 38,850
Number of Bidders 3.70 1.81 2 12
The auctions are organized with a posted reserve price. It is well known that this
reserve price does not act as a screening device to participating to this auction, see e.g.
Haile (2001). To assess such a statement, we have estimated the probability of a bid
being close to the reserve price. Using a nonparametric estimator, we have estimated the
conditional probability Pr(p0 ≤ b ≤ (1 + δ)p0|Z), where p0 denotes the reserve price, b
the bid variable, δ an arbitrary value larger than 0 and Z the appraisal value. At the
average value Z = 57.07, we find this probability to be equal to 1.4% for δ = 0.05, 4.5%
for δ = 0.10 and 9.5% for δ = 0.20. These results indicate that only a few bids are in
the neighborhood of the reserve price and that the possible screening effect of the reserve
price is negligible. It is also interesting to note that no strong relationship was found
between the number of bidders and the value of each lot using various regression models
including Poisson regression models. As a matter of fact, the number of bidders is very
slightly decreasing in the appraisal value.
7.2 Estimation Results
The first step consists in estimating nonparametrically the upper boundary b0(Z`, I`) and
the bid density at this upper boundary g0(b0(Z`, I`)|Z`, I`) for ` = 1, . . . , L. This step
needs to be conducted for each value I = 2, . . . , 12 separately to take into account the
dependence of the observed bids on the number of bidders. In practice, the data provide
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enough auctions for two and three bidders. Above four bidders, the number of observed
auctions is too small for implementing a nonparametric estimator. As the bids increase in
the number of bidders, it is expected that the upper boundary also increases in the number
of bidders at z given. The boundary estimator of Section 6.1 was applied separately for
the 107 auctions with two bidders and the 109 auctions with three bidders. No significant
increase was found. In view of this, we have pooled the data and estimated a unique
upper boundary for the 378 auctions.
Specifically, we let R = 1 hereafter. First, we choose a partition of the interval
[1, 199.58] for Z into 20 equal bins of approximate length 9.93.23 For each bin, we estimate
the coefficients (ak, bk) of the optimal straight line of Section 6.1, which then provides the
estimated boundary b̂N(·). Next, we need to specify a one-sided kernel Φ(·) defined on
[−1, 0] satisfying
∫ 0
−1 Φ(x)dx = 1 and being of order one, i.e.
∫ 0
−1 xΦ(x)dx = 0. The
linear kernel Φ(x) = (6x + 4)1I(−1 ≤ x ≤ 0) satisfies such requirements. The density at
the upper boundary g0(b0(Z`, I`)|Z`, I`) is estimated by Ŷi` as given by (9), where hN is
proportional to (1, 400)−1/5 following the optimal rate of Theorem 3.
The second step consists in estimating the parameter of risk aversion θ. Follow-
ing previous experimental studies on auctions, we choose a CRRA specification, namely
U(x) = xθ, where θ = 1− c. In particular, this choice allows us to test for risk neutrality





v0 − b0(Z`, I`)
+ ei` + εi`, (20)
where ei` is a vanishing bias and εi` is an error term. The optimal weighted NLLS estimator














(I` − 1)(v − b̂N(Z`, I`))
)2
, (21)
where the optimal weights ω∗(Z`, I`) are equal to (I` − 1)(v0 − b0(Z`, I`)) (see Section
6.2). This estimator can be implemented by a standard two-step procedure in which the
optimal weights are first estimated by ordinary NLLS.
23We have tried larger numbers such as 30 and 40. The estimated upper boundaries are different but
did not much affect the estimation results for θ in the second step.
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Another possibility for implementing this estimator is to solve the first-order conditions
associated with the maximization of Q̂N with respect to (θ, v). The resulting estimator
has the same asymptotic properties as given by Theorem 3. The first-order conditions
show that the estimator is similar to an IV estimator of a linear model whose error term
is η̂i` = b̂N(Z`, I`)(I`− 1)Ŷi`− v0(I`− 1)Ŷi` + θ0 and instruments 1/(I`− 1)[v0− b0(Z`, I`)]
and 1/(I` − 1)[v0 − b0(Z`, I`)]2. Alternatively, this IV interpretation can be obtained by
writing (20) as
(I` − 1)b0(Z`, I`)Yi` = −θ0 + v0(I` − 1)Yi` + ηi`,
where ηi` = −(I`−1)[v0−b0(Z`, I`)](ei` +εi`). This equation is linear in (θ0, v0). The error
term ηi` is correlated with the regressor requiring the use of an IV estimator. Following
Chamberlain (1987), the optimal instrumental variables are as above.24 This estimator
is implemented through a two-step procedure, where the first step involves a standard
IV estimator with a vector of instruments (1, Z, Z2, . . .) and [Yi`, b0(Z`, I`)] replaced by
[Ŷi`, b̂N(Z`, I`)]. This provides an estimate for v0, which can be used for the optimal
instruments in the second step.
This estimator has one main advantage. It avoids to maximize the objective function
Q̂N(θ, v) while imposing the constraint on the set of parameters embodied in BN . In
particular, constraining v to be larger than b̂N(Z`, I`) + δ/2 for all ` can raise some
problems when the data set contains some outliers. The highest bid in the data, taking
a value at 665, is clearly an outlier as the second and third highest bids are in the upper
300 range. Consequently, this constrains v to be too large. The above IV estimator
circumvents the need for constraining β to be in BN and of choosing δ.
Theorem 3 derives the asymptotic distribution of the estimator for θ0 and v0. In prac-
tice, it suffices to compute the matrix ÂN(θ̂N , v̂N) and its inverse to obtain the variance
of the estimator (see Section 6.2). Using [1, Z] as instruments in the first step, in the
second step we find θ̂N = 0.394 with a standard error equal to 0.286, while v̂N = 242.20
with a standard error equal to 2.51. We are interested in testing whether bidders are risk
averse, namely whether θ < 1. If θ = 1 (or c = 0), bidders are risk neutral. The one-sided
24The optimal instruments are defined as E[∂ρ(Yi`, Z`, I`, θ0, v0)/∂β | Z`, I`]/E[η2i` | Z`, I`], where
ηi` = ρ(Yi`, Z`, I`, θ0, v0) = b0(Z`, I`)(I`−1)Yi` +θ0−v0(I`−1)Yi`. If another specification for the utility
function is chosen such as CARA, it would lead to a nonlinear IV estimator.
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test of θ = 1 leads us to reject the null hypothesis at 5% with a t-value equal to -2.12.
Thus bidders are risk averse with a constant relative risk aversion coefficient of 0.606.
This coefficient is close to the one found in the experimental literature at about 0.5. As
assuming an upper bound v independent of Z can be restrictive, we have tried a linear
parameterization of the upper boundary, namely v(Z`) = γ0 + γ1Z`, ` = 1, . . . , 378. The
same method as described above applies with some adjustments. In particular there are
three parameters to be estimated instead of two. The estimate for γ1 appears to be non
significant and the estimate for θ0 is similar.
Such risk aversion implies that bidders bid more aggressively relative to the risk neutral
case as they shade less their private values. In particular, a CRRA model is equivalent
of having more competition in the auctions. Namely, for an auction with 4 bidders (the
average number of bidders), a risk aversion parameter at 0.606 is roughly equivalent of
having 6 bidders in an auction with risk neutrality.
The third step can be then implemented. Applying the rule of thumb for the constants
with triweight kernels and using the appropriate vanishing rates give hg = 253.53 and
hG = 322.77. The estimated inverse equilibrium strategy is increasing in b satisfying the
restriction imposed by the model on observables as required by Lemma 1. We observe,
however, some boundary effects. As a result, some observations need to be trimmed out
for the estimation of the underlying conditional density of private values. Specifically, 5
auctions are trimmed out of the original 378 auctions. The estimated conditional density
is displayed in Figure 1 and has been obtained with a bandwidth hf equal to 279.48. The
shape roughly follows a log-normal density with some irregularities.
To assess further the impact of risk aversion, we can compute the winners’ gain in
value v̂w − bw and in percentage (v̂w − bw)/vw for the auctions for which a good estimate
of the private value is obtained. The results are given in the following table. As expected,
the presence of risk aversion, which renders bidding more aggressive, tends to reduce the
gain or informational rent for the winners. As a matter of fact, the USFS captures on
average about 80% of the bidders’ willingness to pay.
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Table 2: Winners’ Informational Rents
Mean STD Min Max
Informational Rent in $ per mbf 84.92 84.99 0.56 992.77
Informational Rents in % 19.83 12.18 3.11 75.73
It is interesting to find an economic rationale for such risk aversion. Bidders’ risk
aversion in timber auctions has been suspected by many authors. See Athey and Levin
(2001) and Baldwin (1995). They observe that the bidders face uncertainty about the
exact volume of each species in a lot leading bidders to split their bids across different
species. The split of bids is then an indicator of bidder’s risk aversion. Risk aversion has
also been found in a different data set of timber auctions in which there is no bidding
on species and bidders pay for their bids and not for harvested timber. See Perrigne
(2001). A reason could arise from the uncertainty of the supply of timber and the limited
outside opportunities besides the timber auctions organized by public institutions. In the
western regions of the US, the USFS is a large supplier of timber. It is likely that given
the uncertainty of the supply outside these auctions, it is important for bidders to win
these auctions. Though more empirical studies need to be performed for other sectors, the
experimental literature shows that overbidding is frequent though the financial stakes are
almost inexistent in the experiments. It seems that risk aversion is a natural component
of the agent’s behavior when facing uncertainty. See the recent work by Goere, Holt and
Palfrey (2002), where the deviations from the risk neutral Nash equilibrium are mainly
explained by bidders’ risk aversion.
Measuring risk aversion is important for the seller when implementing the auction
design. Though the optimal mechanism with risk averse bidders is especially difficult
to implement as it involves some complex transfers (see Maskin and Riley (1984) and
Matthews (1987)), an optimal posted reserve price can be set to generate more revenue
for the seller. For c 6= 1/I, the optimal reserve price p∗0 is solution of
p∗0 = v0 +
1−c
1−cI [F
(I−1)c/(1−c)(p∗0 | z)− F (p∗0 | z)]
f(p∗0 | z)
,
where v0 is the auctioned object value for the seller. Assuming that v0 is equal to the
USFS appraisal value, we find p̂∗0 equal to approximatively $93 for a lot with average
characteristics in terms of value ($57) and number of bidders (4). The same estimate
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conducted for an auction with risk neutral bidders (c = 0) would give an optimal reserve
price at $132, which is significantly larger. The idea is that because the bidders tend to
bid more aggressively with risk aversion, the precommitment effect does not need to be
as important thereby reducing the level of the reserve price that generates the maximum
profit for the seller. These figures show that assessing risk neutrality when implementing
an optimal reserve price policy when risk aversion prevails may have dramatic effects on
seller’s profit and revenue.
8 Conclusion
This paper extends the structural analysis of auction data to the case where bidders
are risk averse. In particular, the methods developed in this paper allow researchers
to estimate and test for bidders’ risk aversion in first-price auctions within the private
value paradigm. This represents an important extension as various experiments have
shown that bidders are risk averse even when the financial stakes are small, suggesting
that risk aversion is a natural component of agents’ behavior. On econometric grounds,
the paper proposes a semiparametric method for estimating the structure of the model,
namely bidders’ risk aversion parameters and the density of their private values. While
previous papers have considered either fully parametric or nonparametric methods, this
paper is the first one proposing a semiparametric estimator that arises naturally from the
identification problem raised by the theoretical auction model.
Specifically, up to some general smoothness conditions, we show that any bid distri-
bution can be rationalized by some auction model with risk averse bidders. On the other
hand, this implies that the auction model with risk averse bidders is not testable in view of
bids only. Moreover, the model is not identified and a model with constant absolute or rel-
ative risk aversion and zero wealth can be considered without loss of explanatory power.
Because of these nonidentification results, we propose minimal restrictions to establish
identification. Parameterization of the utility function and a conditional quantile of the
latent distribution of private values is shown to achieve semiparametric identification of
the model. This naturally leads to a semiparametric estimation method involving non-
parametric boundary estimation, kernel estimators and weighted nonlinear least squares.
We show that our estimator cannot achieve
√
N consistency unlike many other semi-
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parametric estimators, though it attains the best (optimal) rate for estimating the risk
aversion parameters. An illustration of the method is proposed on US Forest Service
auction data. It is found that bidders are risk averse.
Many extensions can be entertained based on our methodology. A first interesting
extension relates to the practice of random reserve prices in auctions such as in timber,
wine, art and web auctions. Within a private value paradigm, Li and Tan (2000) show
that the overbidding effect due to risk aversion accentuated by a secret reserve price may
dominate the precommitment effect of a posted reserve price. Perrigne (2001) extends the
method of the present paper to a model with random reserve prices to assess empirically
the gain for the seller of keeping the reserve price secret instead of posting it. Relying on
the results developed here, Campo (2002) considers an auction model with heterogeneous
bidders, where bidders’ characteristics such as capacity and experience may affect their
attitude towards risk leading to an asymmetric game. Using construction procurement
auction data, she shows that risk aversion is decreasing in bidders’ experience. A third
extension is conducted by Lu (2002) relying on Eso and White (2001) model in which
bidders’ private values are stochastic because of the many ex ante uncertainties about
the value of the auctioned object. Bidders’ risk aversion then affects bidding behavior by
introducing a risk premium. The results obtained by Lu (2002) show that identification
is more involved though some of his restrictions are similar to those in this paper.
Considering risk aversion in auctions represents a great potential for empirical work.
The use of first-price auctions and random reserve prices can be justified by bidders’ risk
aversion. This concerns a large number of applications as these mechanisms are commonly
used. Lastly, from an economic point of view, bidders’ risk aversion is reminiscent of
having financially constrained bidders as financial constraints represent an extreme form
of risk aversion. Che and Gale (1998) study a model in which bidders have two private
signals, one for the value of the auctioned object and the other for their financing ability.
This situation seems realistic for analyzing business-to-business auctions and represents
a promising line of research to explore.
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Appendix A
Appendix A establishes Theorem 1 as an immediate application to the case with no conditioning
variables of the more general Theorem A1 stated below. Proofs of Lemmas used to prove
Theorem A1 are given in Appendix E.
For R ≥ 1, we consider the (nonparametric) model defined by structures [U,F ] ∈ UR × F∗R,
where UR and F∗R are as given in Definitions 1 and 4. For any such structure, the next result
establishes the existence, uniqueness, and smoothness of the equilibrium strategy s(·; z, I). In
addition to obtaining the smoothness of s(·; ·, I) with respect to (v, z), which is nontrivial because
s(·; ·, ·) does not have an explicit form in general, its proof is interesting in its own right as it
tackles directly the singularity at v of the differential equation characterizing s(·; ·, ·) in contrast
to previous work (e.g. Maskin and Riley (1996), Lebrun (1999), Lizzeri and Persico (2000)).
Theorem A1: Let I ⊂ {2, 3, . . .}, R ≥ 1 and Z be a rectangular compact of IRd with nonempty
interior. Suppose that [U,F ] ∈ UR×F∗R, then there exists a unique (symmetric) equilibrium and
its equilibrium strategy s(·; ·, ·) satisfies:
(i) ∀(v, z, I) ∈ (v, v]×Z × I, s(v; z, I) < v, while s(v; z, I) = v,
(ii) ∀(v, z, I) ∈ [v, v]×Z ×I, s′(v; z, I) > 0 with s′(v; z, I) = (I − 1)λ′(0)/[(I − 1)λ′(0) + 1] < 1,
(iii) ∀I ∈ I, s(·; ·, I) admits R+ 1 continuous derivatives on [v, v]×Z.
Proof of Theorem A1: For any [U,F ] ∈ UR × F∗R, it follows from the proof of Theorem 2 in
Maskin and Riley (1984) that a (symmetric) Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy s(·; z, I), when
it exists, must be a strictly increasing and continuous function on [v, v], differentiable on (v, v],
and satisfying the differential equation
s′(v; z, I) = (I − 1) f(v|z, I)
F (v|z, I)
λ (v − s(v; z, I)) , v ∈ (v, v], (A.1)
with initial condition s(v; z, I) = v for every (z, I) ∈ Z × I. Furthermore, they show that such
functions are Bayesian Nash equilibria. As seen from the proof of their Theorem 2, existence
and uniqueness of the equilibrium strategy crucially depends on the existence and uniqueness of
a solution to (A.1). When the reserve price is binding, the latter properties are straightforward
from standard existence and uniqueness results for first-order differential equations. However,
when the reserve price is nonbinding, the explosive behavior of the ratio f(v|z, I)/F (v|z, I)
around v prevents the application of these standard results.
The main idea of the proof is to introduce a suitable transformation of (A.1) that is suffi-
ciently regular to establish the existence and uniqueness of a solution to (A.1). To do so, we
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first show that a Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy must be continuously differentiable on [v, v]
(including at v) and that it must satisfy properties (i)-(ii) of Theorem A1.
Lemma A1: Let I ⊂ {2, 3, . . .} and R ≥ 1. Suppose that [U,F ] ∈ UR × F∗R. Then, for every
(z, I) ∈ Z × I, an equilibrium strategy s(·; z, I), if it exists, is continuously differentiable on
[v, v], satisfies properties (i)-(ii) of Theorem A1, and solves (A.1) for v ∈ [v, v].
In view of Lemma A1, it is convenient to introduce the following set of functions
S1(v) =
{
s: [v, v] → IR continuously differentiable with
s(v) = v, 0 < s′(v) < 1, and s(v) < v, s′(v) > 0 for all v ∈ (v, v]
}
, (A.2)
since a function in S1(v) that solves (A.1) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We then introduce
some appropriate changes of variables and operator notations. Assume temporarily that (A.1)
has a solution s(·; z, I) in S1(v) and, for u ∈ [0, 1], define25
σI(u; v, z) =
s (v + u(v − v); z, I)− v
v − v
for v > v, σI(u; v, z) = s′(v; z, I)u, (A.3)
Λ (x; v) =
λ ((v − v)x)
v − v
for v > v, and x ∈ IR+, Λ(x; v) = λ′(0)x for x ∈ IR− or v = v,
ΦI(u; v, z) = (I − 1)
(v − v)uf (v + u(v − v)|z, I)
F (v + u(v − v)|z, I)
for v > v, ΦI(u; v, z) = (I − 1).
Given [U,F ] ∈ UR × F∗R, the above functions at v = v are obtained by taking their limits as
v ↓ v. Note also that Λ(x; v) is continuously differentiable with respect to x ∈ IR. Moreover,






, v ∈ [v, v], (A.4)
which shows with (A.3) that σI(·; ·, z) and s(·; z, I) are in a one-to-one relationship.26 In what fol-
lows σ(k)I (u; v, z), Φ
(k)
I (u; v, z) and Λ
(k)(x; v) denote the kth derivatives of σI(u; v, z), ΦI(u; v, z)
and Λ(x; v) with respect to u or x.
25The introduction of the additional variable u is standard when studying the smoothness of the
solutions of a first-order differential equation via the Functional Implicit Function Theorem, see Theorem
4.D in Zeidler (1985). In particular, σI(·; v, z) allows us to study (A.1) in the subinterval [v, v] of [v, v].
Dividing by v − v in the definitions of σI and Λ regularizes (A.1) as seen later. This technique can also
be applied to the more general class of utility functions U(b, v) with U(v, v) = 0 considered in Maskin
and Riley (1984).
26In particular, the function s(·; z, I) on [v, v] is given by the function σI(u; v, z) for u ∈ [0, 1]. Note
also that σI(·; v, z) can be computed from σI(·; v′, z) whenever v′ > v.
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We now derive a differential equation for σI(·; v, z). For v > v, we have
σ
(1)
I (u; v, z) = s
′ (v + u(v − v); z, I)
= (I − 1) f (v + u(v − v)|z, I)
F (v + u(v − v)|z, I)
λ (v + u(v − v)− s (v + u(v − v); z, I))
= (I − 1)u(v − v)f (v + u(v − v)|z, I)
F (v + u(v − v)|z, I)
λ ((v − v)u− (v − v)σI(u; v, z))
u(v − v)
= ΦI(u; v, z)
Λ (u− σI(u; v, z); v)
u
, (A.5)
since u − σI(u; v, z) ∈ IR+ for all u ∈ [0, 1] by (A.3) when s(·; z, I) ∈ S1(v). That is, σI(·; v, z)
solves the flow of differential equations with “parameters” (v, z, I) ∈ (v, v]×Z × I
EI(v, z) : σ(1)(u) = ΦI(u; v, z)
Λ (u− σ(u); v)
u
, u ∈ [0, 1], (A.6)
and initial condition σI(0; v, z) = 0 by (A.3) and s(v; z, I) = v. Moreover, EI(v, z) can be
defined by taking the limit as v ↓ v, giving
EI(v, z) : σ(1)(u) =
(I − 1)
u
λ′(0) (u− σ(u)) , u ∈ [0, 1].
A comparison of EI(v, z) with (A.1) shows that the first-order differential equation EI(v, z)
corresponds to a CRRA model with constant relative risk aversion parameter c = 1− 1/λ′(0) ∈
[0, 1) since λ′(0) ≥ 1, with uniform distribution on [0, 1] of the private value. Hence, EI(v, z)
has a unique solution satisfying σI(0; v, z) = 0, namely
σI(u; v, z) =
(I − 1)λ′(0)
(I − 1)λ′(0) + 1
u, u ∈ [0, 1]. (A.7)
Now, solving (A.6) is actually solving (A.1) in the neighborhood of v. In particular, for each
(v, z, I) ∈ [v, v] × Z × I, solving (A.6) with initial condition σI(0; v, z) = 0 can be viewed as
finding zero(s) of the operator
EI(·; v, z) : σ ∈ C01 → EI(σ; v, z) = σ(1)(u)− ΦI(u; v, z)
Λ (u− σ(u); v)
u
, u ∈ [0, 1], (A.8)
where
C01 = {σ : [0, 1] → IR ; σ(0) = 0 and σ continuously differentiable on [0, 1]} ,
and EI(·; v, z) is defined by taking the limit as for EI(v, z) above. Note that EI(σ; v, z) is a
function defined on [0, 1]. Moreover, for any v ∈ [v, v] and σ ∈ C01 , the definition of Λ(x; v) implies
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Λ (u− σ(u); v) /u ∼ λ′(0)(u − σ(u))/u → λ′(0)(1 − σ′(0)) when u ↓ 0, since limu↓0 σ(u)/u =
σ(1)(0). Hence, EI(·; v, z) is an operator, parameterized by (v, z, I), from C01 to















∣∣ ≤ ‖σ(1)‖∞ for all u ∈ [0, 1] to obtain ‖σ‖1,∞ = ‖σ(1)‖∞. Hence,
C01 equipped with ‖·‖1,∞ and C0 equipped with ‖ · ‖∞ are Banach spaces.
The idea of our proof is as follows. In a first step, using that (A.7) is the unique zero
of EI(·; v, z), we show that (A.8) has a unique zero for v in a small interval [v, v0] using a
continuation argument given by Proposition 6.10 in Zeidler (1985). Such an argument requires
so-called a priori conditions on the zeros of (A.8) as summarized by the set of functions
Σ01 =
{
σ ∈ C01 ; 0 < σ′(0) < 1 and σ′(u) > 0, σ(u) < u for u ∈ (0, 1]
}
,
which is the counterpart of S1(v) by (A.3) and (A.5). Note that (A.7) is in Σ01, which is an
open subset of C01 since the open ball V (σ; ε) = {ζ ∈ C01 ; ‖ζ − σ‖1,∞ < ε} ⊂ Σ01 for any σ ∈ Σ01,
provided that ε = εσ > 0 is sufficiently small so that such ζ’s satisfy the constraints defining Σ01.
Because of the relationship between σI(·; v0, z) and s(·; z, I), this step gives us a unique solution
of (A.1) on [v, v0]. In a second step, we apply the standard Picard-Lindelöf Theorem to extend
the unique solution of (A.1) for v ∈ [v, v0] to v ∈ [v0, v], where the ratio f(v|z, I)/F (v|z, I)
remains bounded, using the value of the local solution at v0 as an initial condition. These two
steps are done in Lemma A4. The smoothness of s(v; z, I) as a function of the “parameters”
(v, z) will be given by a Functional Implicit Function Theorem 4.B in Zeidler (1985). This is
done in Lemmas A5 and A6.
To apply the aforementioned theorems, we need to study the partial derivatives of the
operator EI(σ; v, z) with respect to (σ, v, z). This is the purpose of Lemma A3, which relies
on some smoothness properties of Λ(x; v) and ΦI(u; v, z) summarized in the next lemma.
Lemma A2: Under the conditions of Theorem A1, let [U,F ] ∈ UR ×F∗R. Then
(i) Λ(x; v) is R continuously differentiable with respect to (x, v) ∈ IR+ × [v, v], Moreover, the
function (1/x)∂r2Λ(x; v)/∂vr2 is continuous on IR+ × [v, v], for r2 = 0, . . . , R,
(ii) For every I ∈ I, ΦI(u; v, z) is R continuously differentiable with respect to (v, z) ∈ [v, v]×Z
and the partial derivative ∂r2+r3ΦI(u; v, z)/∂vr2∂zr3, r2 + r3 = 0, . . . , R, is continuous with
respect to (u, v, z) ∈ [0, 1]× [v, v]×Z.
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For every I ∈ I, we now compute the partial derivatives of the operator EI(σ; v, z) when
(σ, v, z) ∈ Σ01 × [v, v]× Z. Because σ is a function, it is necessary to use the notions of Fréchet
and Gâteaux derivatives (see e.g. Zeidler (1985)). In what follows
Er1r2r3I (σ; v, z) =
∂r1+r2+r3EI(σ; v, z)
∂σr1∂vr2∂zr3
, 0 ≤ r1 + r2 + r3 ≤ R,
denotes the partial derivatives of EI(σ; v, z), which are linear operators from (C01 )
r1 × IRr2 ×
(IRd)r3 taking values in C0 as EI(σ; v, z) does. Expressions for the operators Er1r2r3I (σ; v, z),
r1 ≥ 1 are easier found using Gâteaux differentiation, namely








(u), η ∈ C01 ,
and then changing the term ηr1 appearing in the above partial derivative into η1 × · · · × ηr1 to
obtain a multilinear form of order r1.27 Specifically, using (A.8) and Lemma A2, we obtain
E1I(σ; v, z)(η1)(u) = E
1,0,0
I (σ; v, z)(η1)(u) = η
(1)
1 (u) + ΦI(u; v, z)Λ
(1) (u− σ(u); v) η1(u)
u
. (A.9)
Because η1(y)/y is continuous over [0, 1] by definition of C01 , Lemma A2 shows that E
1
I(σ; v, z)(η1)
belongs to C0 as required. More generally, for r1 ≥ 1 and (r2, r3) 6= (0, 0), (A.8) gives





ΦI(u; v, z)Λ(r1) (u− σ(u); v)
) η1(u)× · · · × ηr1(u)
u
,
which again is in C0. On the other hand, if r1 = 0, we have by the Liebnitz-Newton formula

























which belongs to C0 because (σ(u)− u)/u ∈ C0, u− σ(u) ≥ 0 since σ ∈ Σ01, and Lemma A2.
27Note that the operator EI(σ; v, z) depends upon Λ(u−σ(u); v) and that Λ(x; v) has derivatives with
respect to x for x ∈ IR+ by Lemma A2 but not necessarily for x ∈ IR−. However, σ + tη ∈ Σ01 for t
sufficiently small because Σ01 is open. The definition of Σ
0
1 then yields that u − σ(u) − tη(u) ≥ 0 for all
u ∈ [0, 1] and the Gâteaux differentiation above is correct because we restrict σ to belong to Σ01, which
is sufficient for our purpose. Derivation over C01 can be achieved by defining Λ(x; v) for x < 0 using the
R+ 1 Taylor expansion of λ(·) at 0 instead of its first-order Taylor expansion as done here.
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The next lemma establishes that the above Gâteaux derivatives are the Fréchet derivatives
of EI(σ; v, z) on Σ01 × [v, v] × Z. Moreover, it checks the conditions of the Functional Implicit
Function Theorem, which will be a key tool to study the existence, uniqueness and smoothness
with respect to (v, z) of the solution to (A.1).
Lemma A3: Under the conditions of Theorem A1, let [U,F ] ∈ UR×F∗R. Then, for every I ∈ I,
(i) EI(σ; v, z) takes its values in C0 for every (σ, v, z) ∈ C01 × [v, v]×Z,
(ii) EI(σ; v, z) is R continuously differentiable on Σ01× [v, v]×Z, with Fréchet partial derivatives
Er1r2r3I (σ; v, z) as given above that are uniformly continuous over Σ
0
1 × [v, v]× Z, provided 0 ≤
r1 + r2 + r3 ≤ R,
(iii) E1I(σ; v, z) is a one-to-one mapping from C
0
1 to C0 for every (σ, v, z) ∈ Σ01 × [v, v]×Z.
We are now ready to prove Theorem A1. Lemma A1 combined with the next lemma estab-
lishes that there exists a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy, which moreover satisfies
properties (i)-(ii) of Theorem A1.28
Lemma A4: Under the conditions of Theorem A1, let [U,F ] ∈ UR × F∗R. Then, for every
(z, I) ∈ Z×I, the first-order differential equation (A.1) has a unique continuously differentiable
solution on [v, v] with initial condition s(v; z, I) = v. Moreover, this solution satisfies properties
(i)-(ii) of Theorem A1.
It remains to establish property (iii) of Theorem A1, i.e. the smoothness of s(v; z, I) with
respect to (v, z). This is done in the following two lemmas using a Functional Implicit Function
Theorem.
Lemma A5: Under the conditions of Theorem A1, let [U,F ] ∈ UR × F∗R. For every (z, I) ∈
Z × I, let s(·; z, I) be the unique solution of (A.1) with s(v; z, I) = v. Then, for every I ∈ I,
the functions s(v; z, I) and s′(v; z, I) are R continuously differentiable with respect to (v, z) ∈
[v, v]×Z.
Lemma A5 yields the existence and continuity of all partial derivatives up to order (R+ 1)
of s(·; ·, I), with the exception of ∂R+1s(·; ·, I)/∂zR+1. Thus, it remains to consider the latter to
complete the proof of Theorem A1-(iii). Let SI(G) be as in Lemma 2.
Lemma A6: Under the conditions of Theorem A1, let [U,F ] ∈ UR×F∗R. Then, for every I ∈ I,
28Lemma A4 can be established under weaker conditions as seen from its proof. First, it is possible to
assume v = +∞. Second, the density f(·|z, I) can vanish at v provided limv↓v(v−v)f(v|z, I)/F (v|z, I) ∈
(0,+∞). These conditions weaken the ones used in Maskin and Riley (1996) and Lebrun (1999).
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(i) The conditional bid distribution G(b|z, I) = F (s−1(b; z, I)|z, I) admits up to R + 1 contin-
uous partial derivatives on SI(G), with inf(b,z)∈SI(G) g(b|z, I) > 0 and a support [b(z, I), b(z, I)]
satisfying infz∈Z
(
b(z, I)− b(z, I)
)
> 0 and b(z, I) = v,
(ii) The function s(·; ·, I) admits up to R+ 1 continuous partial derivatives on [v, v]×Z.
Appendix B
Appendix B gathers proofs of Lemma 1 and Propositions 1–3 stated in Sections 3 and 4.
Proof of Lemma 1: First, we prove that conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) are necessary. Because
bi = s(vi, U, F, I) and the vis are i.i.d., it follows that the bis are i.i.d. so that (i) must hold.
Condition (ii) follows from applying Lemma 2 to the case with no conditioning variables (Z, I).
To prove that condition (iii) is also necessary, consider (4), where the function λ(·) is the
ratio U(·)/U ′(·). Thus λ(·) is defined from IR+ to IR+ because λ(0) = limx↓0 λ(x) = 0, as noted
after Definition 1. Moreover, U(·) admits R+2 continuous derivatives on (0,+∞). As limx↓0 λ(r)
is finite for r = 1, . . . , R+ 1, these imply that λ(·) has R+ 1 continuous derivatives on [0,+∞).
As λ′(·) = 1 − λ(·)U ′′(·)/U ′(·), we have λ′(·) ≥ 1 because λ(·) ≥ 0, U ′(·) > 0 and U ′′(·) ≤ 0. It
remains to show that the function ξ(·) is increasing. The equilibrium strategy must solve the
differential equation (2). As (3) follows from (2), s(·) must satisfy ξ(s(v), U,G, I) = v for all
v ∈ [v, v]. We then obtain ξ(b, U,G, I) = s−1(b, U, F, I). This implies ξ′(·) = [s−1(·)]′, which is
strictly positive by Theorem 1.
Second, we have to show that conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) are together sufficient. Assume that
bids are independently and identically distributed as G(·) ∈ GR and there exists a function λ(·)
satisfying the properties of Lemma 1. First, we construct a pair [U,F ] belonging to UR × FR.
Let U(·) be such that λ(·) = U(·)/U ′(·) or U ′(·)/U(·) = 1/λ(·). By integrating, we obtain
U(x) = U(a) exp[
∫ x
a 1/λ(t)dt] for an arbitrary a > 0. With the normalization U(1) = 1, this
gives U(x) = exp
∫ x
1 1/λ(t)dt. We verify that such a utility function belongs to UR. Because λ(·)
admits R + 1 continuous derivatives on [0,+∞), then condition (iii) of Definition 1 is clearly
satisfied. Moreover, in the neighborhood of zero, λ(t) ∼ λ′(0)t with 1 ≤ λ′(0) < ∞. Thus the
integral
∫ 1
x 1/λ(t)dt diverges to infinity, which implies that U(x) tends to zero as x ↓ 0. Define
U(0) = 0. The derivative U ′(x) is equal to exp
∫ x
1 1/λ(t)dt/λ(x), where λ(·) > 0 on (0,+∞)
because λ(0) = 0 and λ′(·) ≥ 1. This implies that U ′(·) > 0 on (0,+∞). The second-order
derivative gives U ′′(x) = (−λ′(x) + 1) exp
∫ x
1 1/λ(t)dt/λ
2(x). We know that λ′(x) ≥ 1, which
implies that U ′′(·) ≤ 0 on (0,+∞). It remains to show that U(·) admits R + 2 continuous
derivatives. By assumption, λ(·) has R + 1 continuous derivatives on [0,+∞). It follows that
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U(·) admits R + 2 continuous derivatives on (0,+∞). Lastly, U(·) is continuous on (0,+∞) as
limx↓0 U(x) = U(0) = 0.
Let F (·) be the distribution of X = b + λ−1(G(b)/(I − 1)g(b)), where b ∼ G(·). We verify
that such a distribution F (·) belongs to FR. We have F (x) = Pr(X ≤ x) = Pr(ξ(b) ≤ x). The
latter can be written as Pr(b ≤ ξ−1(x)), which is equal to G[ξ−1(x)], because ξ(·) is strictly
increasing by assumption. This implies that F (·) = G(ξ−1(·)) on [v, v], where v ≡ ξ(b) = b
and v ≡ ξ(b) < ∞ by continuity of ξ(·). Because ξ(·) and G(·) are strictly increasing, then
F (·) is strictly increasing on [v, v] and its support is [v, v], which is a finite interval of IR+.
¿From Definition 3, G(·) has R + 1 continuous derivatives on [b, b]. Moreover, ξ(·) is R + 1
continuously differentiable on [b, b]. This follows from the definition of ξ(·), the R+1 continuous
differentiability of λ−1(·) on [0,+∞), and the R + 1 continuous differentiability of G(·)/g(·) on
[b, b], which follows from Definition 3-(iv,v). Thus F (·) = G(ξ−1(·)) admits R + 1 continuous
derivatives on [v, v]. It remains to show that the corresponding density f(·) is strictly positive.
We have f(·) = g(ξ−1(·))/ξ′(ξ−1(·)), where g(·) > 0 from Definition 3 and ξ′(·) is finite on [b, b].
Thus f(·) > 0 on [v, v].
Lastly, we have to show that the pair [U,F ] can rationalize G(·) in a first-price sealed-bid
auction with risk averse bidders, i.e. that G(·) = F (s−1(·, U, F, I)) on [b, b], where s(·, U, F, I)
solves (2) with the boundary condition s(v, U, F, I) = v. By construction of F (·), we have
G(·) = F (ξ(·)). Thus, it suffices to show that ξ−1(·) solves (2) with the boundary condition
ξ−1(v) = v. The boundary condition is straightforward as ξ(b) = b = v. ¿From the construction
of F (·), we have f(·)/F (·) = [ξ−1(·)]′g(ξ−1(·))/G(ξ−1(·)). Thus ξ−1(·) solves the differential
equation (2) if




for all v ∈ [v, v]. Making the change of variable v = ξ(b) and noting that ξ(b)−b = λ−1[G(b)/(I−
1)g(b)] from the definition of ξ(·), it follows that ξ−1(·) solves the differential equation (2) with
boundary condition ξ−1(v) = v.
Proof of Proposition 1: (i) Consider a bid distribution G(·) ∈ GR generated by a structure
[U,F ] ∈ UR × FR. We have to show that there exists a structure [Ũ , F̃ ], where Ũ(x) = x1−c,
0 ≤ c < 1 and F̃ ∈ FR, that rationalizes the distribution G(·). In this case, λ̃(x) = x/(1 − c)
so that λ̃(0) = 0 and λ̃′(·) ≥ 1. ¿From Lemma 1, it suffices to show that there exists a value
c ∈ [0, 1) such that the function







has a strictly positive derivative on [b, b]. Differentiating, this is equivalent to [G(b)/g(b)]′ >







> −I − 1
1− c
. (B.1)
Note that the left-hand side is finite because G(·)/g(·) is R + 1 continuously differentiable on
[b, b], as noted after Definition 3. We consider two cases. If infb[G(b)/g(b)]′ ≥ 0, then we can
choose any value c ∈ (0, 1) to satisfy (B.1). Second, if infb[G(b)/g(b)]′ < 0, (B.1) can be written
as c > 1− (I − 1)/(− infb [G(b)/g(b)]′), where the right-hand side is less than one. Thus we can
always find a value for c ∈ (0, 1) such that G(·) can be rationalized by a CRRA model.
(ii) The proof for the CARA case is similar. Consider Ũ ∈ UCARAR . This gives the utility
function Ũ(x) = (1 − e−ax)/(1 − e−a) with a > 0. Hence λ̃(x) = (eax − 1)/a and λ̃−1(x) =













We have to show that there exists a > 0 such that ξ′(b) > 0 on [b, b]. Differentiating gives the











,∀b ∈ [b, b].
Note that limb↓b[G(b)/g(b)]′ = limb↓b 1−G(b)g′(b)/g2(b) = 1 because R ≥ 1 and g(b) > 0. Hence












This is satisfied for an infinity of values for a > 0 provided the supremum is not +∞. We
know that −(g(b)/G(b))[I − 1+ (G(b)/g(b))′] is R continuously differentiable on (b, b] and hence
continuous on (b, b] because R ≥ 1. Moreover, limb↓b−(g(b)/G(b))[I − 1 + (G(b)/g(b))′] = −∞
because g(b)/G(b) tends to +∞ and [G(b)/g(b)]′ tends to 1. Thus, we can always find a value
for a and hence a CARA model that can rationalize any bid distribution G(·).
Proof of Proposition 2: (i) Nonidentification of the general model. Consider a structure
[U,F ] ∈ UR×FR, which generates a bid distribution G(·) ∈ GR by Lemma 1. Suppose first that
U(·) is not of the form x1−c for any c, 0 ≤ c < 1. ¿From Proposition 1, it follows that there
exists a CRRA structure [Ũ , F̃ ] with zero wealth and F̃ ∈ FR that leads to the same equilibrium
bid distribution G(·). Because a CRRA utility function with zero wealth belongs to UR, the
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original structure [U,F ] is not identified. Suppose next that U(·) is of the form x1−c for some c,
0 ≤ c < 1. From the second part of the proposition, which is proven below, there exists another
CRRA structure with zero wealth, and hence another risk aversion structure [Ũ , F̃ ] with F̃ ∈ FR
that is observationally equivalent to [U,F ]. Hence [U,F ] is again not identified.
(ii) Nonidentification of the CRRA, CARA, DRRA and DARA models. We first show that
the CRRA model is not identified. Consider a structure [U,F ] where U(·) is derived from a
CRRA vNM utility function with some wealth w ≥ 0 and F ∈ FR. This generates a bid
distribution G(·) ∈ GR. Proposition 1 shows that there exist a CRRA utility function Ũ(·) with
zero wealth and 0 ≤ c̃ < 1 and a distribution F̃ (·) ∈ FR leading to the bid distribution G(·). If
U(·) is not of the form x1−c, then [U,F ] is not identified. If U(·) is of the form x1−c, the proof
of Proposition 1 shows that there exists an infinity of values for c̃, c < c̃ < 1, generating the
same distribution G(·). Thus the CRRA model is unidentified. We can use a similar argument
to show that the CARA model is unidentified from the proof of Proposition 1-(ii).
Next, consider a structure [U,F ] ∈ UDRRAR ×FR defining a DRRA model and generating a bid
distribution G(·) ∈ GR. Note that UCRRAR ⊂ UDRRAR . If U(·) is generated from a vNM utility
function with constant relative risk aversion, we know from above that there exists another
CRRA structure that is observationally equivalent to [U,F ]. On the other hand, if U(·) is
generated from a vNM utility function with partly strictly decreasing relative risk aversion, we
know from Proposition 1 that there exists an observationally equivalent CRRA structure with
zero wealth. Thus the DRRA model is unidentified. A similar argument shows that the DARA
model is unidentified.
Proof of Proposition 3: We distinguish two parts. The first part concerns the identification
of the general semiparametric model composed of structures [U,F ] satisfying Assumption A1,
while the second part concerns the identification of the CRRA and CARA models.
Part 1. Let [U,F ] satisfy Assumption A1 with parameters (θ, γ) and G(·|·, ·) be the corre-
sponding equilibrium bid distribution given (Z, I). Suppose that there exists another structure
[Ũ , F̃ ] satisfying A1 with parameters (θ̃, γ̃) and leading to the same conditional bid distribution.





= λ(vα(z, I; γ)− bα(z, I); θ) = λ(vα(z, I; γ̃)− bα(z, I); θ̃), (B.2)
for every (z, I) ∈ Z × I. Hence A1-(iv) implies that (θ̃, γ̃) = (θ, γ). ¿From A1-(i), Ũ(·) =
U(·; θ̃) = U(·; θ) = U(·), which establishes the identification of U(·). Moreover, from (4), we
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have









for every b ∈ [b(z, I), b(z, I)] and (z, I) ∈ Z × I. This shows that F̃ (·|·, ·) = F (·|·, ·), i.e. that
the latter is identified.
Part 2. We have U(x) = x1−c with 0 ≤ c < 1 for the CRRA model and U(x) = (1 −
exp−ax)/(1 − exp−a) with a > 0 for the CARA model. Conditions (i)–(iii) of Assumption A1
are satisfied, where vα(z, i) = γ. Thus, it suffices to verify condition (iv).
For the CRRA model, we have λ(γ − bα(z, I); θ) = (γ − bα(z, I))/θ, where θ = 1 − c. By
assumption there exist two pairs (z1, I1) and (z2, I2) belonging to Z × I such that bα(z1, I1) 6=
bα(z2, I2). Hence, (γ − bα(z1, I1))/θ 6= (γ − bα(z2, I2))/θ. On the other hand, knowing the
function λ(γ − bα(·, ·); θ) for every (z, I) ∈ Z × I and hence for (z1, I1) and (z2, I2) gives a
system of two linear equations in two unknown parameters (θ, γ). Because the determinant of
such a system is not equal to zero, there is a unique solution.
For the CARA model, we have λ(γ − bα(z, I); θ) = (expθ(γ−bα(z,I))−1)/θ, where θ = a. By
assumption there exist two pairs (z1, I1) and (z2, I2) belonging to Z × I such that bα(z1, I1) 6=
bα(z2, I2). Hence, λ1 6= λ2, where λj = (expθ(γ−bα(zj ,Ij))−1)/θ for j = 1, 2. Rearranging terms,




= θ[bα(z1, I1)− bα(z2, I2)],
where bα(z1, I1) > bα(z2, I2) without loss of generality and hence λ2 > λ1 > 0. Differentiating
twice with respect to θ the left-hand side shows that the left-hand side is strictly increasing and
concave in θ on [0,+∞). Because one root of the above equation is θ = 0, there is at most one
other strictly positive root. Thus, θ is uniquely determined, which gives a unique γ.
Appendix C
Appendix C gathers proofs of Lemma 2 and Theorem 2 stated in Section 5. Proofs of Lemmas
used to prove Theorem 2 are given in Appendix E. Throughout, let ξ(·; z, I) = s−1(·; z, I).
Proof of Lemma 2: We have b(z, I) = s(v; z, I), which admits R + 1 continuous derivatives
on Z by Theorem A1-(iii). The other assertions in (i)–(iii) follow from Lemma A6-(i).
To prove (iv), we note that ξ(b; z, I) = F−1[G(b|z, I)|z, I]. Hence, ξ(·; ·, I) is R+ 1 continu-
ously differentiable on SI(G). Moreover, we have from (4)
g(b|z, I) = 1
I − 1
G(b|z, I)
λ (ξ(b; z, I)− b)
(C.1)
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with λ (ξ(b; z, I)− b) > 0 because s(v; z, I) < v whenever v > v by Theorem A1. Therefore,
Lemma A6 and the composition rule for differentiation give that g(·|·, I) admits up to R + 1
continuous partial derivatives on SuI (G), which establishes (iv).
It remains to show (v). Omit the dependence on (z, I) to simplify the notation. From
Theorem 1, it follows that s−1(·) admits R+ 1 continuous derivatives on [b, b] with [s−1(·)]′ > 0
on [b, b]. Now, from (3), we have G(b)/g(b) = (I − 1)λ[s−1(b) − b]. Because λ(·) and s−1(·)
are R+ 1 continuously differentiable on [0,+∞) and [b, b], then G(·)/g(·) is R+ 1 continuously
differentiable on [b, b], and hence admits a finite limit as b ↓ b.
Proof of Theorem 2: We begin by studying the smoothness of m(z, I;β), as summarized in
the next lemma.
Lemma C1: Let (U0, F0) satisfy Assumption A2-(i,ii) for some β0 = (θ0, v0) ∈ Θo× (0,∞) and
I finite. Let b0(z, I) be the upper boundary of the support of the corresponding bid distribution
G0(·|z, I), where (z, I) ∈ Z × I. Then, for every I ∈ I, the function m(z, I;β) defined in (7) is
R + 1 continuously differentiable on Z × B, where B = {(θ, v); θ ∈ Θ, v > sup(z,I)∈Z×I b0(z, I)}
with sup(z,I)∈Z×I b0(z, I) < v0.
Now, let tN ≥ 0 be such that tN/ρN = o(1), and ψ(·) : IR− → IR be an infinitely differentiable
function on IR− with support [−1, 0], such that ψ(0) = 1,
∫
ψ(x)dx = 0. Let 1Ip = (1, . . . , 1)′ ∈
IRp. For a fixed constant κ > 0 to be chosen below, consider the following perturbations of θ0
and g0(b|z, I), I ∈ I,
β1 = (θ1, v0) = (θ0 + 2tN1Ip/ρN , v0),









πN (z, I) = m (z, I;β1)−m(z, I;β0) =
∂m(z, I;β0)
∂β
(β1 − β0) + o(‖β1 − β0‖) = O(1/ρN ).
Note that {(θ, v), θ = θ0 +2tN1Ip/ρN , N = 1, 2, . . . , v = v0} can be assumed to be in B since θ0 ∈
Θo and v0 > sup(z,I)∈Z×I b0(z, I). Thus, the reminder term is uniform in z because ∂m(·, I; ·)/∂β
is continuous on Z ×B by Lemma C1, and hence uniformly continuous on the product of Z and
any compact subset of B containing {(θ, v), θ = θ0 + 2tN1Ip/ρN , N = 1, 2, . . . , v = v0}.
¿From Lemma 2-(i,iii) it follows that g1(·|z, I) is a conditional density with support [b0, b0(z, I)]
for N large enough. It is important to verify that such a density corresponds to a structure
[U(·; θ1), F1] in our semiparametric model. This is established in the next Lemma. For j = 0, 1,
define








, (z, I) ∈ Z × I, b ∈ [v0, b0(z, I)].
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Lemma C2: Let (U0, F0) satisfy Assumption A2-(i,ii) for some β0 = (θ0, v0) ∈ Θo × (0,∞),
f0 ∈ F∗R(M) and I finite. For κ > 0 small enough and N large enough, we have
(i) For every (z, I) ∈ Z × I, G1(·|z, I) is rationalized by the IPV auction structure with risk
aversion [U(·; θ1), F1(·|z, I)], where F1(·|·, I) ∈ F∗R with support [v0, v0],
(ii) The conditional distribution function F1(·|·, ·) is such that (β1, f1) ∈ Vε(β0, f0).
We now turn to the statistical part of the proof. Because ‖ρN (β1 − β0)‖∞ = 2tN , using the
triangular inequality we have for any β̃
Prβ1,f1
(








‖ρN (β̃ − β0)‖∞ < tN
)
.

































where FL is the σ-field generated by {(Z`, I`), 1 ≤ ` ≤ L}.
Let PrjN be the probability of the Bi` given FL under gj(·|·, ·), for j = 0, 1. Standard
relations between the distance in variation, the L1 norm and the Hellinger distance (see e.g.
Bickel, Klaassen, Ritov and Wellner (1993, p.464)) yield
Pre(FL) = 1−
(








































But, because gj(·|·, ·), j = 0, 1, are bounded away from zero and sup(z,I)∈Z×I πN (z, I) =























































































)dx+ O (ρ−3N )
















uniformly in `, since
∫










































= 1 + o(1).















Appendix D establishes Theorem 3 stated in Section 6. Proofs of Lemmas used to prove Theorem
3 are given in Appendix E. Throughout, let FL be the σ-field generated by {(Z`, I`), 1 ≤ ` ≤ L},














We first state a series of lemmas. The first lemma studies the bias and error terms of (10).
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Lemma D1: Let Assumptions A2, A3 and A4-(iii,iv) hold.
(i) The variables Yi` (or εi`), 1 ≤ i ≤ I`, 1 ≤ ` ≤ L are independent given FL,
(ii) Uniformly in (i, `),




















(iii) Uniformly in (i, `)
Var[εi`|FL] =














The second lemma is a Central Limit Theorem, which is useful for weighted averages of εi`.
Lemma D2: Let Assumptions A2, A3 and A4-(iii,iv) hold. For any u ∈ IRN \ {0} that is
FL-measurable with ‖u‖∞/(‖u‖2
√









d→ N (0, 1)
conditionally on FL and thus unconditionally.
The third and fourth lemmas control the error |Ŷi` − Yi`| and |m̂(·, ·;β)−m(·, ·;β)| arising from
estimating the upper boundary b0(·, ·).















































∥∥∥∥∂m̂(Z`, I`;β)∂β − ∂m(Z`, I`;β)∂β
∥∥∥∥
∞
= OP (aN ).
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The next two lemmas study the properties of the limit and convergence of the approximate
objective function QN (·) defined in (19).
Lemma D5: Let Assumptions A2, A3 and A4-(i,ii) hold. Define
Q(β) = E
[
Iω(Z, I) (m(Z, I;β)−m(Z, I;β0))2
]
.
Then, for any ε > 0, there exists Cε > 0 such that infβ∈Bδ ;‖β−β0‖∞≥εQ(β) > Cε. Moreover, the
matrix A(β) and B(β) defined in (14) and (15) are of full rank in a neighborhood of β0.




∣∣∣∣ = OP ( 1√L
)
= oP (1).
















where A(β), B(β), AN (β), BN (β) and b(β, g0) are defined in (14)–(18), and








































Lemma D7: Let Assumptions A2, A3 and A4-(i–iv) hold. If β̃N = β0 + oP (1), then we have
supβ∈Bδ |WN (β)| = OP (1) and W
(1)
N (β̃N ) = oP (1).
Proof of Theorem 3: The proof is in 2 steps.
Step 1: Consistency. Note that |max1≤`≤L b̂N (Z`, `)− sup(z,I)∈Z×I b0(z, I)| < δ/4 with proba-
bility approaching one by Assumptions A4-(v) and A3-(i), where the latter implies that {Z`, ` =
1, 2, . . .} is a.s. dense in Z by the Glivenko-Cantelli Theorem and the bounds on the g(z, I)s.
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Thus, sup(z,I)∈Z×I b0(z, I) + δ/4 < max1≤`≤L b̂N (Z`, `) +δ/2 < sup(z,I)∈Z×I b0(z, I) + 3δ/4 <
v0 < vsup with high probability, using Assumption A4-(i). That is, v0 ∈ BN ⊂ Bδ/4 with high
probability for N large enough.

















































ω(Z`, I`) (m(Z`, I`;β)− m̂(Z`, I`;β))2
]1/2
.






















since aN = o(
√
aN/hN ) by Assumption A4-(iv). On the other hand, (10), (12) and the inequality
(x1 + x2 + x3)2 ≤ 3(x21 + x22 + x23) yield







(m(Z`, I`;β)−m(Z`, I`;β0))2 + e2i` + ε2i`
]
= OP (N) +OP (NhR+1N ) +OP (N/hN ) = OP (N/hN ), (D.2)
uniformly in β ∈ Bδ/4. The second equality follows from Assumption A4-(ii,iv), Lemma C1






i` = OP (N/hN ) by Markov inequality. Thus,
combining (D.1) and (D.2) gives
sup
β∈Bδ/4
|Q̂N (β)−QN (β)| = sup
β∈Bδ/4

























= oP (N), (D.3)
since aN = o(h3N ) by Assumption A4-(v).
56
Next, consider QN (β)−QN (β0)−QN (β), where QN (β) is defined by (19). We have





ω(Z`, I`)(ei` + εi`) (m(Z`, I`;β)−m(Z`, I`;β0))
using (10). Hence, Lemmas D1 and D7 together with Assumption A4-(iv) yield
sup
β∈Bδ/4




+OP (NhR+1N ) = oP (N). (D.4)
Thus, using (D.3), (D.4), Lemma D6 and L  N gives
sup
β∈Bδ/4
∣∣∣∣ 1LQ̂N (β)− 1LQ̂N (β0)−Q(β)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ sup
β∈Bδ/4
∣∣∣∣ 1LQ̂N (β)− 1LQN (β)











Combining this with Lemma D5 and recalling that v0 ∈ BN ⊂ Bδ/4 with high probability show
that the usual consistency conditions of M-estimators are satisfied (see e.g. White, 1994). Hence
β̂N converges in probability to β0.
Step 2: Asymptotic Normality. Given Assumption A4-(i), we have sup(z,I)∈Z×I b0(z, I) + δ <
v0 < vsup. Thus, β0 is an inner point of BN with high probability. Hence, because it is a








Ŷi` − m̂(Z`, I`; β̂N )









Ŷi` − m̂(Z`, I`;β0)












∂m̂(Z`, I`;β0 + t(β̂N − β0))
∂β′
dt (β̂N − β0).
Therefore,




















Ŷi` − m̂(Z`, I`;β0)













∂m(Z`, I`;β0 + t(β̂N − β0))
∂β′
dt+OP (NaN )
= AN (β0) + oP (N) = NA(β0) + oP (N), (D.6)
where A(β0) has an inverse by Lemma D5.






ω(Z`, I`) (Yi` −m(Z`, I`;β0))










∂m(Z`, I`; β̂N )
∂β
− m̂(Z`, I`;β0)















∂m̂(Z`, I`; β̂N )
∂β








i |Yi`| = OP (N/
√
hN ) by Lemmas C1 and D1, using Markov and




i |εi`| = OP (N/
√
hN ), which is the leading term given







ω(Z`, I`) (Yi` −m(Z`, I`;β0))
∂m(Z`, I`; β̂N )
∂β


















































Using (10), the consistency of β̂N , Lemmas C1, D1 and D7 with Assumption A2-(ii) imply that








































































































hN ) = OP (1/
√

















Collecting (D6)–(D.8) and using β̂N − β0 = Ĵ−1N ŜN from (D.5) give























showing that β̂N − β0 = OP (hR+1N + 1/
√
NhN ). This also gives the limits in probability and in
distribution of Theorem 3-(ii,iii). Moreover, N−1ÂN (β̂N ) = A(β0) + oP (1) and N−1B̂N (β̂N ) =
B(β0) + oP (1) can be established arguing as in (D.6).
Appendix E
Appendix E gathers proofs of Lemmas stated in Appendices A, C, and D.
E.1 Proofs of Lemmas A1–A6
Proof of Lemma A1: Fix (z, I) ∈ Z × I, and omit (z, I) to simplify the notation.
First, we show that property (i) holds. Recall from Maskin and Riley (1984) that s(·) is
continuous and strictly increasing on [v, v] with s(v) = v. Consider the optimization problem
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(1) of an arbitrary bidder with a private value v ∈ (v, v]. If b ≥ v, we have EΠ ≤ 0 since
U(v − b) ≤ 0.29 On the other hand, if b < v, we have U(v − b) > 0 because U(·) > 0
on (0,+∞) by Definition 1. Moreover, if b ∈ (v, v), which implies b > v = s(v), we have
Pr(bidder wins) = 1I[b ≤ s(v)]F I−1[s−1(b)] + 1I[b > s(v)], which is strictly positive because
F [s−1(b)] > F [v] = 0. Hence, EΠ > 0 if b ∈ (v, v). This shows that the optimal bid must satisfy
b < v whenever v ∈ (v, v].
Next, we show that s(·) is continuously differentiable on [v, v] and that s′(·) satisfies property
(ii). Because s(·) solves (A.1) on (v, v], property (i) implies that s′(·) is continuous and strictly
positive on (v, v]. Thus, it remains to prove that s(·) is continuously differentiable at v with
0 < s′(v) < 1. Let




if v ∈ (v, v], Ψ(v) = (I − 1)λ′(0) if v = v.
Note that Ψ(·) is continuous on [v, v]. For v0 ∈ [v, v], define
γ(v0) = inf
v∈[v,v0]
Ψ(v) > 0, Γ(v0) = sup
v∈[v,v0]
Ψ(v) <∞,
where the first inequality follows from f(·|z, I) > 0, property (i) and λ′(0) > 0. Moreover, γ(·)
and Γ(·) are continuous on [v, v] with γ(v) = Γ(v) = (I − 1)λ′(0) > 0 and Γ(v)/(1 + γ(v)) < 1.
Hence, there exists a v0 ∈ (v, v] with 0 < Γ0/(1 + γ0) < 1, where 0 < γ0 ≡ γ(v0) ≤ Γ(v0) ≡ Γ0.










We use these inequalities to find upper and lower bounds on s′(v). Let κ(v) = (v−v)Γ0 [s(v)−v]
for v ∈ [v, v0]. Differentiating and using the above inequalities, we obtain for v ∈ (v, v0]
γ0(v − v)Γ0 ≤ κ′(v) = (v − v)Γ0−1[Γ0(s(v)− v) + (v − v)s′(v)] ≤ Γ0(v − v)Γ0 ,
since γ0 ≤ Γ0. In particular, this shows that limv↓v κ′(v) = 0, which implies that κ′(v) exists
and is equal to 0 using the Mean Value Theorem. Hence, γ0(v − v)Γ0 ≤ κ′(v) ≤ Γ0(v − v)Γ0
for any v ∈ [v, v0], which implies that κ′(·) is integrable on [v, v0]. Moreover, because κ(v) = 0,
we obtain κ(v) =
∫ v
v κ
′(x)dx ≤ Γ0(v − v)Γ0+1/(Γ0 + 1) for v ∈ [v, v0]. Similarly, letting κ(v) =
29Though Definition 1 requires U(·) to be defined on IR+ only, we could have defined it on IR, as
U(x) = UvNM (w + x) − UvNM (w) for x ∈ IR. In this case U(x) < 0 whenever x < 0 because UvNM (·)
and hence U(·) are strictly increasing, while U(0) = 0.
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(v − v)γ0 [s(v)− v] for v ∈ [v, v0], we obtain κ(v) ≥ γ0(v − v)γ0+1/(γ0 + 1) for v ∈ [v, v0]. Thus,
using the definitions of κ(·) and κ(·), we obtain
γ0
γ0 + 1
[v − v] ≤ s(v)− v ≤ Γ0
Γ0 + 1
[v − v] for any v ∈ [v, v0].




≤ s′(v) ≤ Γ0
γ0 + 1
< 1 for any v ∈ (v, v0].
In particular, these inequalities hold at v0. Using γ0 ≡ γ(v0) and Γ0 ≡ Γ(v0) converge to γ(v) =
Γ(v) = (I − 1)λ′(0) > 0 as v0 ↓ v, we obtain that limv0↓v s′(v0) = (I − 1)λ′(0)/[(I − 1)λ′(0) + 1],
which is strictly between 0 and 1. Application of the Mean Value Theorem between v and v
establishes that s′(v) exists and is equal to (I − 1)λ′(0)/[(I − 1)λ′(0) + 1]. Moreover, s′(·) is
continuous at v, which implies that (A.1) also holds at v by taking the limit as v ↓ v because
Ψ(·) is continuous at v.
Proof of Lemma A2: Without loss of generality, assume that v = 0. For (i), let x > 0 and































On the other hand, a Taylor expansion of λ(0) = λ(vx − vx) = 0 around vx with integral










(1− t)r2(−vx)r2+1λ(r2+1) (vx− tvx) dt.





















The Lebesgue Dominated Convergence Theorem shows that these functions are continuous on
IR+ × [v, v] because r1 + r2 ≤ R and λ(·) is R+ 1 continuously differentiable on IR+.
For (ii), using the definition of ΦI(·; ·, ·), and note that the partial derivatives up to order
R of (v, z) → f(vu|z, I) are continuous with respect to (u, v, z). Note also that vu/F (vu|z, I)
is bounded away from infinity uniformly in (u, v, z) as minv,u,z f(vu|z, I) > 0. The rules of
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differentiation then shows that (ii) is proved if the partial derivatives up to order R with respect
to (v, z) of F (vu|z, I)/(vu) are continuous with respect to (u, v, z). Since ∂r3F (0|z, I)/∂zr3 = 0
and using the same argument as for Λ(·; ·) replaced by (1/v)∂r3F (vu|z, I)/∂zr3 with u playing























where ∂y indicates differentiation with respect to the first argument of F (·|z, I). The Lebesgue
Dominated Convergence Theorem shows that (ii) is proved when [U,F ] ∈ UR × F∗R since r2 +
r3 + 1 ≤ R+ 1.
Proof of Lemma A3: Note that (i) has been shown after (A.8).
(ii) When r1 = 0, the desired property is easy to prove using Lemma A2. For r1 ≥ 1, we
first show that Er1r2r3I (σ; v, z) is a continuous r1-multilinear operator from (C
0
1 )
r1 to C0 when
(σ, v, z) ∈ Σ01 × [v, v]× Z. As noted above, this operator maps (C01 )r1 into a subset of C0. The
norm of r1-multilinear operators A(η1, . . . , ηr1) from (C
0
1 )
r1 to C0 is
ρr1(A) = sup
‖η1‖1,∞=···=‖ηr1‖1,∞=1
‖A(η1, . . . , ηr1)‖∞ ,
and A is continuous if ρr1(A) < ∞ (see Zeidler (1985, p.773)). Consider E1I(σ; v, z). By
definition of ‖ · ‖∞ and ‖ · ‖1,∞, we have from (A.9)∥∥E1I(σ; v, z)(η1)∥∥∞ ≤ ∥∥∥η(1)1 ∥∥∥∞ + supu,v,z |ΦI(u; v, z)| sup(x,v)∈[0,1]×[v,v]







|ΦI(u; v, z)| sup
(x,v)∈[0,1]×[v,v]
∣∣∣Λ(1) (x; v)∣∣∣] ‖η1‖1,∞,





1 (y)dy‖∞ ≤ ‖η1‖1,∞. Now, the compactness of [0, 1], [v, v], Z and
Lemma A2 give ρ1(E1I(σ; v, z)) <∞. The other operators E
r1r2r3
I (σ; v, z) are treated similarly.
We now show the uniform continuity of (σ, v, z) 7→ Er1r2r3I (σ; v, z) relative to ρr1(·), r1 ≥ 1.
We consider (r1, r2, r3) = (1, 0, 0), the other partial derivatives being treated similarly using
Lemma A2. For any (σ0, v0, z0), (σ, v, z) in Σ01 × [v, v]×Z, we have as above
ρ1
(




∣∣∣ΦI(u; v, z)Λ(1) (u− σ(u); v)− ΦI(u; v0, z0)Λ(1) (u− σ0(u); v0)∣∣∣ ,
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which can be made arbitrarily small independently of (σ0, v0, z0) by taking ‖σ − σ0‖∞ ≤ ‖σ −
σ0‖1,∞, |v− v0| and ‖z− z0‖ small by Lemma A2, because σ and σ0 take values in the compact
set [0, 1], and (v, z), (v0, z0) are also in compact sets.
To find the Fréchet derivatives of EI(σ; v, z), we note that the above operators Er1r2r3I (σ; v, z)
are actually the Gâteaux derivatives of EI(σ; v, z) over Σ01 × [v, v]×Z. It then follows from the
continuity of these Gâteaux partial derivatives on Σ01 × [v, v] × Z that the E
r1r2r3
I (σ; v, z)s are
also the Fréchet partial derivatives of EI(σ; v, z) by Proposition 4.8 in Zeidler (1985).
(iii) Fix (σ, v, z, I) ∈ Σ01 × [v, v] × Z × I. To show that E1I(σ; v, z) is a one-to-one operator
from C01 to C0, consider ζ ∈ C0. ¿From (A.9), solving E1I(σ; v, z)(η) = ζ for η ∈ C01 leads to
solving the following first-order linear differential equation




Λ(1) (u− σ(u); v)
u
]
η(u) = ζ(u) with η(0) = 0.
Because the term in brackets diverges as u ↓ 0, standard approaches to solve E1I (v, z) on [0, 1]
do not apply. In particular, solving this equation with ζ = 0 would lead to consider the integral∫ 1
u
ΦI(y; v, z)






λ′ ((v − v)(y − σ(y)))
y
dy → +∞ when u ↓ 0,
since ΦI(0; v, z) = i − 1 and λ′(·) ≥ 1. Nevertheless, it can be readily shown that the unique


















is defined on [0, 1] with Rσ(0) = 0. Moreover, 0 ≤ Rσ(y) ≤ Rσ(u) for 0 ≤ y ≤ u implies
|η0(u)| ≤ ‖ζ‖∞u, so that η0(·) is defined on [0, 1] with η0(0) = 0.
The proof of (iii) is complete by showing that η0 ∈ C01 and that η0 solves E1I (v, z) at 0. This
is done via the following two steps: a) η0 is differentiable at 0; b) η
(1)
0 is continuous at 0 and
satisfies E1I (v, z) at u = 0. For the sake of simplification, assume that v = 0 and I = 2.














¿From the definition of Φ2(·; ·, ·) and Λ(·; v) combined with infz f(0|z, 2) > 0 under Definition































+O(1) when x ↓ 0. (E.2)

























(1 + o(1)) .


















where λ′(0)/geq1. Hence η0(·) is differentiable at 0.
(iii.b) η(1)0 is continuous at 0 and satisfies E
1
I (v, z) at u = 0. We show that the value
η
(1)
0 (0) = ζ(0)/(λ
′(0) + 1) given by (E.3) is consistent with E12(v, z). The differential equation
E12(v, z), (E.2) and (E.3) yield, for u ↓ 0,
η
(1)
0 (u) = ζ(u)−
Φ2(u; v, z)
u
Λ(1) (u− σ(u); v) η0(u)














as required by (E.3). Hence η0 solves E12(v, z) and is C1 on [0, 1].
Proof of Lemma A4: Fix (z, I) ∈ Z × I. The differential equation (A.1) is not defined if
s(v; z, I) > v because λ(·) is defined on IR+. We thus extend (A.1) to
Ẽ(z, I) : s′(v; z, I) = (I − 1) f(v|z, I)
F (v|z, I)
λ̃ (v − s(v; z, I)) , v ∈ [v, v] , (E.4)
with s(v; z, I) = v, where λ̃(x) = λ(x) if x ≥ 0, and λ̃(x) = λ′(0)x if x ≤ 0. Note that
λ̃(·) is continuously differentiable on IR, and that λ̃(·) is consistent with our previous definition
of Λ(x; v), which can be equivalently defined as Λ(x; v) = λ̃[(v − v)x]/(v − v) if v > v, and
Λ(x; v) = λ̃′(0)x if v = v, for x ∈ IR. Moreover, because λ̃(v − s(v)) = λ(v − s(v)) as soon
as s(v) ≤ v, then s(·; z, I) is a continuously differentiable solution of (A.1) on [v, v] with initial
condition s(v; z, I) = v if and only if it is a solution in S1(v) of (E.4). To prove Lemma A4, it
thus suffices to show that (E.4) has a solution, which is unique in S1(v). This is done in three
steps.
Step 1: The continuously differentiable solutions of (E.4) with initial condition s(v; z, I) = v
are in S1(v). Let s(·; z, I) be such a solution, if it exists.
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We first check that s(·; z, I) verifies the conditions of S1(v) in a neighborhood [v, v0] of v.
For v > v close to v, we have
0 = F (v|z, I) = F (v|z, I) + (f(v|z, I) + o(1)) (v − v),
0 = λ̃ (v − s(v; z, I)) = λ̃ (v − s(v; z, I)) +
[(
1− s′(v; z, I)
)
λ̃′ (v − s(v; z, I)) + o(1)
]
(v − v),
where the remainder terms o(1) = ov(1) are uniform in v since f(v|z, I) and s′(v; z, I) are
continuous on [v, v], while λ̃(·) is continuously differentiable on IR. Substituting in (E.4) and
simplifying give




1− s′(v; z, I)
)




s′(v; z, I) = lim
v↓v
s′(v; z, I) =
(I − 1)λ′(0)
(I − 1)λ′(0) + 1
∈ (0, 1).
Therefore, there is a v0 ∈ (v, v] such that s(v; z, I) < v and s′(v; z, I) > 0 for all v ∈ (v, v0].
We now check that s(·; z, I) verifies the conditions of S1(v) over [v0, v]. Observe that
s(v; z, I) < v should be true at least on an interval [v0, v∗), v∗ > v0. Let v1 > v be the
largest possible v∗ ≤ v. Note that s(v1; z, I) = v1 and s′(v1; z, I) = 0 by (E.4). Because R ≥ 1,










λ (v1−s(v1; z, I)) +
f(v1|z, I)
F (v1|z, I)








since λ′(·) ≥ 1 and f(·|z, I) > 0 on [v, v]. Consequently, a second-order Taylor expansion for
ε > 0 small enough yields s(v1−ε; z, I) = v1 +ε2(s′′(v1; z, I)/2+o(1)), which, since s′′(v1; z, I) >
0, contradicts the condition s(v1 − ε; z, I) < v1 − ε coming from the definition of v1. Thus
s(v; z, I) < v for all v ∈ [v0, v], which also gives s′(v; z, I) > 0 for all v ∈ [v0, v]. This shows that
all continuously differentiable solutions of (E.4) with s(v; z, I) = v are in S1(v). Equivalently,
all the zeros in C01 of the operator EI(·; v, z) defined in (A.8) are in Σ01 ⊂ C01 .
Step 2: (E.4) has a unique continuously differentiable solution on a small interval [v, v0], v0 > v
with initial condition s(v; z, i) = v. Equivalently, we want to show that the operator EI(·; v, z)
given in (A.8) has a unique zero in C01 for v = v0. Existence and uniqueness of this solution
follow using a continuation argument given in Proposition 6.10 in Zeidler (1985) as EI(·; v, z)
has a unique zero in C01 , namely the solution given by (A.7).
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For v0 ∈ [v, v], define
γ(v0) = inf
v∈[v,v0],u∈[0,1]












where the inequalities follow from f(·|z, I) > 0 and Λ(0; v)/0 = λ′(0) > 0. Moreover, Lemma
A2 implies that Γ(·) and γ(·) are continuous. Thus, Γ(v) = γ(v) = (I − 1)λ′(0) > 0 and
Γ(v)/(1 + γ(v)) < 1. Hence, there exists a v0 ∈ (v, v] with 0 < Γ0/(1 + γ0) < 1, where
0 < γ0 ≡ γ(v0) ≤ Γ(v0) ≡ Γ0.
Now, if σI(·; v, z) is a zero in C01 of EI(·; v, z), then σI(·; v, z) ∈ Σ01 by Step 1. Thus, using












dropping the dependence upon (z, I) to simplify the notation. Thus, the same argument as in
the proof of Lemma A1-(ii) with v = 0 and [v, s(v)] replaced by [u, σ(u, v)] gives
γ0
γ0 + 1
u ≤ σ(u; v) ≤ Γ0
Γ0 + 1




≤ σ(1)(u; v) ≤ Γ0
γ0 + 1
< 1 for any u ∈ [0, 1] and every v ∈ [v, v0].
This implies that there is an ε > 0 such that
{ζ ∈ C01 ; ‖ζ(·)− σ(·; v)‖1,∞ < ε} ⊂ Σ01 for any σ(·; v) zero in C01 of EI(·; v, z), v ∈ [v, v0].
Because Σ01 is open, it follows that the a priori condition (ii) of the continuation argument in
Proposition 6.10 of Zeidler (1985) is satisfied.
We now check condition (iv) of Proposition 6.10 in Zeidler (1985), and in particular, that
the norm of the (linear) operator
[
E1I(σ; v)
]−1 is uniformly bounded for (σ, v) ∈ Σ01× [v, v0]. For
any ζ ∈ C0, (E.1) gives η0 =
[
E1I(σ; v)
]−1 (ζ). Hence ∣∣E1I(σ; v)]−1 (ζ)‖1,∞ = ‖η0‖1,∞ = ‖η(1)0 ‖∞,
where η(1)0 + Φ(u; v)Λ
(1) (u− σ(u); v) η0(u)/u = ζ(u) by (A.9). Hence∥∥∥[E1I(σ; v)]−1 (ζ)∥∥∥
1,∞
≤ ‖ζ‖∞ +





















for any (σ, v) ∈ Σ01× [v, v0], because Rσ(y) ≤ Rσ(u) and Λ(1)(x; v) = λ′((v− v)x), recalling that
0 ≤ u−σ(u) ≤ 1. Thus, the norm of the operator
[
E1I(σ; v)
]−1 is uniformly bounded, as desired.
Because the other assumptions of Proposition 6.10 of Zeidler (1985) have been established
in Lemma A3, the continuation argument yields that EI(·; v0, z) has a unique zero σI(·; v0, z)
in C01 since EI(·; v, z) has a unique zero (A.7) on C01 . Moreover, σI(·; v0, z) ∈ Σ01. Thus, (A.4)
implies that






, v ∈ [v, v0]
is the unique continuously differentiable solution of (E.4) on [v, v0] with s0(v; z, I) = v. Moreover,
0 < s′0(v; z, I) < 1, and s0(v; z, I) < v, s
′
0(v; z, I) > 0 for v ∈ [v, v0].
Step 3: (E.4) has a unique continuously differentiable solution on [v, v] with initial condition
s(v; z, I) = v. We extend s0(·; z, I) on [v, v]. Let λ̃∗(x) = λ̃(x) if x ≤ v, and λ̃∗(x) = λ̃′(v)x if
x ≥ v. Consider the first-order differential equation that coincides with (A.1) for s(·) ∈ S1(v)
Ẽ∗(z, I) : s′(v) = (I − 1) f(v|z, I)
F (v|z, I)
λ̃∗ (v − s(v)) , s(v0) = s0(v0; z, I), v ∈ [v0, v], (E.5)
where 0 < s0(v0; z, I) < v0 by Step 2. Define






∣∣λ′(x)∣∣ <∞, Q0 = [v0, v]× IR,
so for any (v, b1), (v, b2) in Q0,∣∣∣∣(I − 1) f(v|z, I)F (v|z, I) λ̃∗ (v − b1)− (I − 1) f(v|z, I)F (v|z, I) λ̃∗ (v − b2)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ L|b1 − b2|,
by the Mean Function Theorem. It now follows from the Picard-Lindelöf Theorem (see Corollary
1.10 in Zeidler (1985)) that Ẽ∗(z, I) has exactly one continuously differentiable solution, say
s1(v; z, I) for v ∈ [v0, v].
Define s(v; z, I) = s0(v; z, i) for v ∈ [v, v0], s(v; z, I) = s1(v; z, I) for v ∈ [v0, v]. We check
that s(·; z, I) is the unique continuously differentiable solution of (E.4) on [v, v] with s(v; z, I) =
v. Note first that s(v; z, I) is continuously differentiable at v0 by (E.4) and (E.5), the initial
condition s1(v0; z, I) = s0(v0; z, I), and 0 < v0 − s0(v0; z, I) < v. To establish that s(·; z, I)
solves (E.4) for v ∈ [v, v] with s(v; z, I) = v, it suffices to show that s1(v; z, I) solves (E.4) for
v ∈ [v0, v] with s1(v0; z, I) = s0(v0; z, I), since s0(v; z, I) already solves (E.4) for v ∈ [v, v0] with
s0(v; z, I) = v. In view of (E.5), it suffices to show that v − s1(v; z, I) ≤ v for v ∈ [v0, v]. The
latter holds if s1(·; z, I) > 0, which is implied by s1(v0; z, I) = s0(v0; z, I) > 0 and s′1(·; z, I) > 0
on [v0, v], which follows by repeating the second part of Step 1 to establish that s1(v; z, I) < v
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for v ∈ [v0, v]. Uniqueness of s(·; z, I) on [v, v] follows from the uniqueness of s0(·; z, I) and
s1(·; z, I) on [v, v0] and [v0, v], respectively.
Proof of Lemma A5: Fix I ∈ I. We first show that the mapping (v, z) → σI(·; v, z) from
[v, v] × Z to the Banach space
(
C01 , ‖ · ‖1,∞
)
is R continuously differentiable. By (A.8) and
Lemma A4, σI(·; v, z) is a (unique) zero of the operator EI(·; v, z) in Σ01 ⊂ C01 , i.e.
EI(σI(·; v, z); v, z) = 0 for all (v, z) ∈ [v, v]×Z.
It follows from Lemma A3 that EI(·; v, z) verifies the conditions of the Functional Implicit
Function Theorem 4.B-(d) in Zeidler (1985). Therefore (v, z) → σI(·; v, z) is R continuously
differentiable on the interior of [v, v]×Z. Now note that the partial derivatives of EI(·; v, z) are
continuous over [v, v]×Z. It then follows from the expression of the implicit partial derivatives
(see the proof of Theorem 4.B in Zeidler (1985)) and arguing as in the proof of Lemma C1
in Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000), that the partial derivatives of (v, z) → σI(·; v, z) have
limits at the boundaries, so that this mapping is R continuously differentiable with respect to
(v, z) ∈ [v, v]×Z.
To prove the desired result, note that σ ∈ (C01 , ‖·‖1,∞) 7→ σ(1) is a linear continuous mapping,
which is therefore infinitely continuously differentiable. It then follows from the differentiation
rule with respect to composition that σI(1; v, z) is R continuously differentiable with respect
to (v, z) ∈ [v, v] × Z. Hence, by (A.4), s(v; z, I) = v + (v − v)σI(1; v, z) is R continuously
differentiable with respect to (v, z) ∈ [v, v]×Z. Next, for u = 1, (A.5) yields
s′(v; z, I) = σ(1)I (1; v, z) = ΦI(1; v, z)Λ (1− σI(1; v, z); v) , (v, z) ∈ [v, v]×Z.
Hence, s′(v; z, I) is R continuously differentiable with respect to (v, z) ∈ [v, v] × Z by Lemma
A2, the derivation rules for composition and product of functions, and 0 ≤ σI(1; v, z) < 1.
Proof of Lemma A6: Fix I ∈ I and let ξ(·; z, I) = s−1(·; z, I).




> 0 by continuity of s(v; ·, I) and compactness of Z. The conditional distribution G(·|z, I) =
F (ξ(·; z, I)|z, I) has support [b(z, I), b(z, I)] because F (·|z, I) and s(·; z, I) are strictly increasing
and continuous on [v, v]. Its density is g(b|z, I)= f(s−1(b; z, I)|z, I)/ s′(s−1(b; z, I); z, I). Thus
inf(b,z)∈SI(G) g(b|z, I) > 0 using Definition 4-(iii).
We now study the smoothness of G(·|·, I). Note that Lemma A5 shows that G(b|z, I) and
g(b|z, I) admit up to R continuous partial derivatives on SI(G) since inf(v,z)∈[v,v]×Z s′(v; z, I) > 0
by definition of S1(v) and Lemmas A4–A5. Thus, it remains to prove that ∂GR+1(·|·, I)/∂zR+1
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exists and is continuous on SI(G). Let G(1)(b|z, I) = g(b|z, I). Using the expression of the latter




s−1(b; z, I)|z, I
]
(I − 1)λ [s−1(b; z, I)− b]
=
G(b|z, I)
(I − 1)λ [F−1 (G(b|z, I)|z, I)− b]
, (E.6)
since G(·|z, I) = F (s−1(·; z, I)|z, I) and F−1(G(b|z, I)|z, I) = s−1(b; z, I) > b on (b(z, I), b(z, I)]
as s(·; z, I) ∈ S1(v). Thus, the distribution G(·|z, I) solves the first-order differential equation
EGI (z) : G
(1)(b) =
G(b)
(I − 1)λ [F−1 (G(b)|z, I)− b]
, G(b(z, I)) = 1, b ∈ (b(z, I), b(z, I)],
excluding b(z, I) in order to avoid the singularity at that point. Consider (b0, z0) in the interior
of SI(G). The function
(b,G, z) → G
(I − 1)λ [F−1 (G|z, I)− b]
admits up to R+1 continuous partial derivatives on a neighborhood of (b0, G(b0|z0, I), z0). Hence
the Implicit Function Theorem 4.D for first-order differential equations in Zeidler (1985, p.165)
yields that the solution G(b|z, I) of EGI (z) has an R+ 1 continuous z-derivative at (b0, z0), and
thus in the interior of SI(G). Arguing as in the first part of the proof of Lemma A5, the proof
of Theorem 4.D in Zeidler (1985) shows that this extends to the upper boundary b(·, I).
We now extend this result to the lower boundary b(·, I) = b = v, assuming d = 1 for sake of
simplicity. Because Z is rectangular, differentiating (E.6) with respect to z for any b > b yields








λ (F−1 (G(b|z, I)|z, I)− b)
− G(b|z, I)
λ2 (F−1 (G(b|z, I)|z, I)− b)
λ′
(
F−1 (G(b|z, I)|z, I)− b













λ (F−1(G(b|z, I)|z, I)−b)
≡ A(b; z, I)




Note that A(·; ·, I) has up to R continuous partial derivatives on SI(G). Moreover, limb↓b supz∈Z
|A(b; z, I)− 1| = 0 since F−1(0|z, I) = v is independent of z. Thus, there exists a b0 close enough
to b such that A(b; z, I) > 0 on [b, b0]×Z. For 1 ≤ r ≤ R+ 1 and b > v, define the property







= Dr(b; z, I) +
A(b; z, I)





where Dr(·; ·, I) admits up to R+ 1− r partial continuous derivatives on [b, b0]×Z. Note that
P1 is true. We prove by induction that PR+1 is also true.
Suppose that Pr is true for some r with 1 ≤ r ≤ R. Then Pr+1 is true since P1 and Pr yield























F−1 (G(b|z, I)|z, I)− b
)
λ2 (F−1 (G(b|z, I)|z, I)− b)
+
A(b; z, I)


























F−1 (G(b|z, I)|z, I)− b
)
λ (F−1 (G(b|z, I)|z, I)− b)
+
A(b; z, I)
λ (F−1 (G(b|z, I)|z, I)− b)
∂r+1G(b|z, I)
∂zr+1
≡ Dr+1(b; z, I) +
A(b; z, I)




where Dr+1(b; z, I) has up to R − r ≤ R − 1 continuous partial derivatives at b and thus on
[b, b0] × Z by proceeding as in Lemma A2 and observing that ∂F−1 (G(b|z, I)|z, I) /∂z = 0 for
all z ∈ Z, and that G(·|·, I), g(·|·, I) and A(·; ·, I) are R-continuously differentiable on SI(G).
Therefore, using ξ(b; z, I) = F−1(G(b|z, I)|z, I), PR+1 yields






= DR+1(b; z, I) +
A(b; z, I)
λ (ξ(b; z, I)− b)
∂R+1G(b|z, I)
∂zR+1
























































Without loss of generality, assume b = 0. ¿From Lemma A1, we have ξ′(b; z, I) = [(I−1)λ′(0)+
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1]/[(I − 1)λ′(0)]. Hence, when b ↓ 0,
A(b; z, I) = 1 + o(1),
1











(I − 1)λ (ξ(y; z, I)− y)
dy
)
= b exp(O(1)) = O(b),
uniformly in z ∈ Z because λ′(0) ≥ 1. By definition of b0, which is such that A(b; z, I) > 0 for




∣∣∣∣ ≤ b0 − bI − 1 sup(b,z)∈(b,b0]×Z |DR+1(b; z, I)|+O(b) supz∈Z
∣∣∣∣∂R+1G(b0|z, I)∂zR+1
∣∣∣∣ .
Consider now an arbitrary ε > 0. Note first that b0 can be chosen small enough so that the first
term is smaller than ε/2. Next, observe that there is a 0 < η < b0 such that the second term
is smaller than ε/2 whenever b < η. Consequently, for any ε > 0 there is a η > 0 such that
sup(b,z)∈(0,η]×Z
∣∣∂R+1G(b|z, I)/∂zR+1∣∣ ≤ ε. Hence, limb↓0 supz∈Z ∣∣∂R+1G(b|z, I)/∂zR+1∣∣ = 0.
Collecting results, G(·|·, I) admits up to R+ 1 continuous partial derivatives on SI(G).
(ii) We have s(v; z, I) = G−1 (F (v|z, I)|z, I). Thus (i) shows that s(·; ·, I) admits up to R+1
continuous partial derivatives on [v, v]×Z.
E.2 Proofs of Lemmas C1–C2
















v − b0(z, I); θ
) ,
where (θ, v) ∈ B. By Lemma 2-(i), b0(·, I) has R + 1 continuous derivatives on Z with R ≥ 1.
The desired result follows from the R + 2 continuous differentiability of U(·; ·) on (0,+∞)×Θ
and the definition of B. That sup(z,I)∈Z×I b0(z, I) < v0 follows from the compactness of Z, the
finiteness of I, Lemma 2-(i) and Theorem A1-(i) applied at v = v0.
Proof of Lemma C2: The proof is in four steps.
Step 1: G1(·|·, ·) satisfies the properties of Lemma 2. Let Ψ(b) =
∫ b
−∞ ψ(x)dx. We have



























In particular, G1(·|z, I) and g1(·|z, I) are equal to G0(·|z, I) and g0(·|z, I) on [v0, b0(z, I) −
ρ
−1/(R+1)
N ], while differing from the latter by an O(1/ρN ) on [b0(z, I)−ρ
−1/(R+1)
N , b0(z, I)]. Now,
G0(·|·, ·) satisfies Lemma 2 under Assumption A2. Moreover, Ψ(·) is infinitely differentiable on
IR−, while πN (·, I) is R + 1 continuously differentiable on Z in view of Lemma C1. Therefore,
for N large enough, G1(·|·, ·) satisfies the properties of Lemma 2 with b1(z, I) = b0(z, I) = v0
and b1(z, I) = b0(z, I) for all (z, I) ∈ Z × I. In particular, as for G0(·|·, I)/g0(·|·, I), the ratio
G1(·|·, I)/g1(·|·, I) is R+ 1 continuously differentiable on SI(G0) for every I ∈ I.





















































, b ∈ (v0, b0(z, I)],
where the first and second equalities hold for 0 ≤ r ≤ R + 1 and 0 ≤ r ≤ R, respectively. By
Lemma 2-(i) there is a b∗ with v0 < b∗ < b0(z, I) for all (z, I). Because supz,I |πN (z, I)| =
O(1/ρN ), this gives for r = 0, . . . , R+ 1,
sup
(b,z,I)∈∪Z,I [b∗,b0(z,I)]×{z,I}
∣∣∣∣∂rG1(b|z, I)∂br − ∂rG0(b|z, I)∂br
∣∣∣∣ = κr−1O(ρ r−1−(R+1)R+1N ) , (E.8)
sup
(b,z,I)∈∪Z,I [b∗,b0(z,I)]×{z,I}
∣∣∣∣∂rg1(b|z, I)∂br − ∂rg0(b|z, I)∂br
∣∣∣∣ = κrO(ρ r−(R+1)R+1N ) , (E.9)
where the remainder terms are independent of κ.












































































(I − 1)g0(b|z, I)
; θ0
)]∣∣∣∣ . (E.10)
The difference in the sup term is a difference of polynomials in the variables 1/gj(b|z, I),
g
(k)
j (b|z, I), G
(k)
j (b|z, I) and ∂kλ−1(·; θj)/∂xk evaluated at Gj(b|z, I)/[(I − 1)gj(b|z, I)], for k =
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uniformly on [b∗, b0(z, I)] by (E.8)-(E.9). Regarding the second
term in (E.10), note that λ−1(x; θ) is R+ 1 continuously differentiable on [0,+∞)×Θ because
λ(x; θ) is R+1 continuously differentiable on [0,+∞)×Θ by Assumption A2-(i) and λ′(·; θ) ≥ 1.
Thus, because G0(·|·, I)/g0(·|·; I) is R + 1 continuously differentiable on SI(G0), the function
∂rλ−1 (G0(b|z, I)/[(I − 1)g0(b|z, I)]; θ) /∂br is continuous on SI(G0)×Θ. Hence, the second term
is of order ‖β1 − β0‖∞ = O(tN/ρN ) = o(1) uniformly on SI(G0), for r = 0, . . . , R + 1, because





∣∣∣∣∂rξ1(b; z, I)∂br − ∂rξ0(b; z, I)∂br
∣∣∣∣ = κrO(ρ r−(R+1)R+1N )+o(1) , r = 0, . . . , R+1. (E.11)
Step 3: Proof of (i). Because R ≥ 1, applying (E.11) for r = 1 yields that ξ′1(·; z, I) > 0 on
[v0, b0(z, I)] for every (z, I) ∈ Z × I. Because G1(·|z, I) satisfies Definition 3, Lemma 1 shows
that G1(·|z, I) is rationalized by [U(·; θ1), F1(·|z, I)] for every (z, I) ∈ Z × I, where F1(·|z, I) is
the distribution of ξ1(b; z, I) with b ∼ G1(·|z, I).
We now check that F1(·|·, ·) ∈ F∗R, as required by Assumption A2-(ii). The support of
F1(·|z, I) is the same as F0(·|z, I), namely [v0, v0]. Indeed, we have v1(z, I) = ξ1(v0; z, I) = v0.
Moreover, by definitions of λ(·; θ) and g1(·|z, I), and ψ(0) = 1
v1(z, I) = ξ1(b0(z, I); z, I)





g0(b0(z, I)|z, I) +m(z, I;β1)−m(z, I;β0)
; θ1
)

















because g0(b0(z, I)|z, I) = m(z, I;β0) by (6) and the definition of m(z, I;β). Also, it can be seen
that F (·|·, I) is R+1 continuously differentiable on [v0, v0]×Z with a density satisfying Definition
4-(iii) in view of the properties of ξ1(·; ·, I) and G1(·|·, I) as F1(·|z, I) = G1(ξ−11 (·; z, I)|z, I).
Step 4: Proof of (ii). Let sj(v; z, I) = ξ−1j (v; z, I). Using the same argument as in Step 2 of
the proof of Lemma B1 in Guerre, Perrigne, Vuong (2000), it follows that s1(v; z, I)− s0(v; z, I)
also satisfies (E.11), where ξj(b; z, I) is replaced by sj(v; z, I), for j = 0, 1. Now, f1(v|z, I) =





∣∣∣∣∂rf1(v|z, I)∂vr − ∂rf0(v|z, I)∂vr
∣∣∣∣ = κr+1O(ρ r−RR+1N )+ o(1), r = 0, 1, . . . , R.
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In particular, for r = 0 we obtain ‖f1(·|·, ·)− f0(·|·, ·)‖∞ < ε for N sufficiently large. Moreover,
for r = R the triangular inequality gives ‖∂Rf1(·|·, ·)/∂vR‖ < M because ‖∂Rf0(·|·, ·)/∂vR‖ < M
by assumption, provided κ is sufficiently small.
E.3 Proofs of Lemmas D1–D7
Proof of Lemma D1: (i) The variables Yi` are independent given FL because the Vi`s (and
then the Bi`s) are independent given FL. The same property holds for εi` as εi` = Yi`−E[Yi`|FL].
(ii) We have 0 < hN ≤ inf(z,I)∈Z×I(b0(z, I) − b0(z, I)) by Assumption A4-(iv), I finite and









































using Assumption A4-(iii). Then (ii) follows because g0(b0(·, I)|·, I) = m(·, I;β0).












































]∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2 supx∈IR |Φ(x)|hN .
Proof of Lemma D2: It suffices to check the Lyapounov condition of Theorem 7.3 in Billingsley
















Thus, E[|ui`εi`|3|FL] ≤ E[|ui`εi`|2|FL]O(‖u‖∞/hN ). Hence, by independence of the εi`s given
























which is an oP (1) by assumption.
Proof of Lemma D3: In view of Assumption A4-(v), let aN  aN be such that the event
EN = {maxi,` |b̂(Z`) − b0(Z`)| ≤ aN} has a probability larger than 1 − ε, where ε > 0 can
be chosen arbitrary small. Hereafter, we consider that EN occurs. By Assumption A4-(iii),
Φ(·) is continuously differentiable on IR−, with support [−1, 0]. In particular, Yi` = Ŷi` = 0
if Bi` ≤ b0(Z`, I`) − an − hn. Note also that aN < hN for N sufficiently large by Assumption
A2-(v). In order to bound Ŷi` − Yi` on EN , we use a first-order Taylor expansion of Φ(·) when
b0(Z`, I`)−an−hn ≤ Bi` ≤ b0(Z`, I`)−2an, while we use that Φ(·) is bounded when b0(Z`, I`)−
2an ≤ Bi` ≤ b0(Z`, I`). This gives










Bi` − b0(Z`, I`)
hN
)∣∣∣∣∣












Bi` − b0(Z`, I`)
)
.
Let ζi` denote the right-hand side. Now, because aN = o(hN ) by Assumption A4-(v), and





































































Using E[|X|] ≤ E1/2[X2], the Markov inequality conditional on FL and that Pr(EN ) ≥ 1 − ε
establishes the desired results.
Proof of Lemma D4: By definition of Bδ, we have δ ≤ v − b0(Z`, I`) ≤ vsup for all `. By
Assumption A4-(v), we have |b̂(Z`, I`)− b0(Z`, I`)| < δ/2 for all ` with probability tending to 1.
Thus, δ/2 ≤ v − b̂(Z`, I`) ≤ vsup + δ/2 for all ` with probability tending to 1. Now,










v − b0(Z`, I`); θ
)
 .
Hence, the denominators are uniformly bounded away from 0 with probability tending to 1. The
desired result follows from Assumption A2-(i) since λ(x; θ) is R+1 continuously differentiable
on ∈ [0,+∞] × Θ, and hence uniformly continuous on the compact [δ/2, vsup + δ/2] × Θ. The
study of the derivatives is similar.






(m(z, I;β)−m(z, I;β0))2 dz.
Thus, Q(β) = 0 is equivalent to m(z, I;β) = m(z, I;β0) for all (z, I) ∈ Z × I by continuity of
m(z, I;β) −m(z, I;β0) with respect to z whenever β ∈ Bδ in view of Lemma C1 and Bδ ⊂ B.
By definition of m(z, I;β0), this gives
λ
(




v0 − b0(z, I); θ0
)
, ∀(z, I) ∈ Z × I.
Hence, Assumption A2-(iii) yields β = β0. Therefore, Q(β) = 0 if and only if β = β0. Moreover,
because Bδ is compact, Lemma C1 yields that Q(·) is continuous on Bδ and hence on Bδ ∩{‖β−
β0‖ ≥ ε} by the Lebesgue Dominated Convergence Theorem. This implies the first claim.








v − b0(z, I); θ
) ∂λ (v − b0(z, I); θ)
∂β
= −(I − 1)m2(z, I;β)
∂λ
(




with m(z, I;β) ≥ m > 0 for all β ∈ Bδ, z ∈ Z, I ∈ I because m(z, I;β) does not vanish and is
continuous on Z×Bδ by Lemma C1. Moreover, the Lebesgue Dominated Convergence Theorem
and Lemma C1 yield that det(A(β)) is a continuous function of β ∈ Bδ. Thus, it is sufficient
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to show that A(β0) is of full rank. Assume that A(β0) is not of full rank. Then, there exists
t ∈ IRp+1 \ {0} with t′A(β0)t = 0. Arguing as for Q(·), we have


















v0 − b0(z, I); θ0
)
∂β
= 0 , for almost all z ∈ Z and all I ∈ I.
This contradicts Assumption A4-(i) by continuity of λ(·; θ0).
Proof of Lemma D6: Observe that the function I`ω(Z`, I`) [m(Z`, I`;β)−m(Z`, I`;β0)]2 is
a Lipschitz function with respect to β ∈ Bδ with a Lipschitz constant that can be chosen
independently of (β, β0, Z`, I`) by Lemma C1 and the compactness of Bδ and Z. The first
statement of the lemma with the order OP (1/
√
L) follows from the maximal inequality (19.36) in
van der Vaart (1998) upon computing the bracketing number of the class of functions {[m(·, ·;β)−
m(·, ·;β0)]2;β ∈ Bδ} on Z × I. See Example 19.7 in van der Vaart (1998).
The other statements of the lemma are direct consequences of e.g. the Lindeberg-Levy





















i=1 ω(Z`, I`;β)m(Z`, I`;β)εi` so that WN (β) =
(L/N)1/2L−1/2
∑L
`=1w`L(β) with w`L iid within rows. Because L/N is bounded, it suffices to
establish that supβ∈Bδ
∣∣L−1/2 ∑L`=1w`L(β)∣∣∣ = OP (1). Now, by Lemma C1 and D1, Assumption












Var[w`(β)] ≤ C, max
1≤`≤L
E1/2[w`(β)− w`(β′)]2 ≤ C ‖β − β′ ‖
for all L. This is sufficient to apply the maximal inequality of Lemma 19.36 in van der Vaart


















where C ′ and C ′′ are positive constants independent of L. Applying Markov inequality, this
gives supβ∈Bδ |WN (β)| = OP (1).
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Regarding W (1)N (β̃N ), note that β̃N ∈ Bδ with probability tending to 1, because β0 ∈ Boδ and
β̃N = β0 + oP (1). Therefore, W
(1)
N (β̃N ) = oP (1) holds if we can show that supβ∈Bδ |W
(1)
N (β)| =
OP (1). This can be done as above.
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